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LIFTING THE VEILS OF EQUITY IN
MARITIME ENTITLEMENTS:
EQUIDISTANCE WITH PROPORTIONALITY
AROUND THE ISLANDS
PHAEDON JOHN KOzYRIs*
I. INTRODUCTION
The modern maritime entitlements over vast oceanic spaces over
the continental shelf and over the exclusive economic zone have
produced sharp disagreements among neighboring nations about their
delimitation, the definition of their borders, many of which remain
unresolved. Economic interests are only part of the picture. The rest is
nationalistic pride of the mine and the thine.
For almost half a century international law has been striving to
develop a fair and predictable regime of delimitation through two major
multilateral, if not global, treaties'. One would have expected the
process to be easy. The basis of entitlement has been clear and
undisputed from day one: extended territorial sovereignty and
appurtenance results from adjacency to a coast. What is left is only the
quasi-ministerial task of charting lines on the map by means of some
identifiable and workable methods. Yet it is only now, after many
decades of international adjudication and arbitration, 2 and after the
* Professor of Law, University of Thessaloniki, Greece; Professor of Law, Emeritus, the
Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, USA.
1. Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No.
5578, 449 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereafter Geneva Convention]; United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, December 10, 1982, U.N.Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M.
1261, in force since November 16, 1994 [hereafter UNCLOS]. Separate articles provide
for entitlement and for delimitation both in the Geneva Convention (articles 1 and 6), and
in and UNCLOS (articles 55-71, 76-82 and 74, 83).
2. See generally Anglo-French Continental Shelf Arbitration, 16 I.L.M. 54 (1977)
[hereinafter Anglo-French Arbitration]; Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia
v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18 (Feb. 24) [hereinafter Tunisia-Libya]; Case
Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v.
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct.ober 12) [hereinafter Gulf of Maine]; Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, 24 I.L.M. 267 (1985) [hereinafter
Guinea-Guinea/Bissau]; Case Concerning The Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
v. Malta) 1985 I.C.J. 13 (June 3) [hereinafter Libya-Malta]; Court of Arbitration for the
Delimitation of Maritime Areas Between Canada and France (St. Pierre and Miquelon),
31 I.L.M. 1145 (1992) hereinafter St. Pierre & Miquelon]; Case Concerning Maritime De-
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conclusion of numerous agreements in particular regions, that an
intelligible regime of delimitation is starting to gel.
The blame for this delay and confusion lies mainly with the North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases [hereinafter "North Sea"]. 3 In the first
delimitation adjudication in 1969, the ICJ [hereinafter "ICJ"],
uncomfortable with the apparent dominance of equidistance, took a
wrong doctrinal turn and set sail upon the uncharted waters of an
elusive equity. In this uncertain environment, another wrong doctrinal
turn came later, mostly in some writings, in deciding the question of
whether islands were to be treated somehow differently than
mainlands.
These doctrinal turns have haunted the delimitation
process ever since. The actual borders in the cases already decided,
while on balance reasonable, were drawn despite rather than because of
them.
While the literature on these maritime zones, including the
equitable quest 4 and the island question,5 is immense, 6 this article

limitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38
(June 14) [hereinafter Jan Mayen] (important cases decided after North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases).
3. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3
(Feb. 20) [hereinafter North Sea].
4. See, M.D. Blecher, Equitable Delimitation of Continental Shelf, 73 AM. J. INT'L.
L. 60 (1979); Vladimir-Djuro Degan, Equitable Principles in Maritime Delimitations,in 2
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT AGO 107 - 137 (1987); Robert Jennings, Equity and
Equitable Priniciples, in 1986 ANNUAIRE SUISSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 27; Barbara

Kwiatkowska, The ICJ Doctrine of Equitable PrinciplesApplicable to Maritime Boundary
Delimitation and Its Impact on the International Law of the Sea, in FORTY YEARS
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: JURISDICTION, EQUITY AND EQUALITY 119 (A. Bloed &

P. van Dijk eds., 1988) [hereinafter Kwiatkowska, Forty Years]; T. Rothpfeffer, Equity in
the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 42 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR INTERNATIONAL RET.

81, 84 - 86 (1972); Paul Bravender-Coyle, The Emerging Legal Principles and Equitable
Criteria Governing the Deliminatoin of Martime Boundaries Between States, 19 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L L. 171 (1988); Barbara Kwiatkowska, Equitable Maritime Boundary
Delimintation, as Exemplified in the Work of the InternationalCourt of Justice During the
Presidency of Sir Robert Yewdall Jennings and Beyond, 28 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 91
(1997) [hereinafter Kwaitkowska, Jennings];Ruth Lapidoth, Equity in InternationalLaw,
22 ISR. L. REV. 161 (1987); Elihu Lauterpacht, Equity, Evasion, Equivocation and
Evolution in International Law, AM. BRANCH IINT'L L. ASS'N, PROC. & COMM. REP. 33

(1977 - 78). Two recent books on international equity cover the maritime dimension in
rather general terms: MASAHIRO MIYOSHI, CONSIDERATIONS OF EQUITY IN THE
SETTLEMENT OF TERRITORIAL AND BOUNDARY dISPUTES (1993) [hereinafter MIYOSHI]; and
CHRISTOPHER R. ROSSI, EQUITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1993) [hereinafter ROSSI].

5. We even find major monographs dedicated exclusively to the issues raised by the
presence of islands such as HIRAN W. JAYEWARDENE, THE REGIME OF ISLANDS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1988) [hereinafter JAYEWARDENE]. Most of the major pieces, however, antedate St. Pierre & Miquelon and Jan Mayen; the key pieces, however, addressed
the island question more fully and in the most acute context will inform the present arti-
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updates the implications of the two most recent and important cases,
St.Pierre & Miquelon and Jan Mayen. Its most significant novelty,
however, lies in lifting the veils of the purported marine equity to show
that after North Sea, through a negative sorting out process, the courts
have been able to reach sensible outcomes by accommodating the
equitable qualms about equidistance through the concept of
proportionality of zones to coastal lengths, and that, therefore, the
doctrinal imbroglio created by North Sea should finally be laid to rest.
Particular attention will be paid to specific solutions, including the
mechanics of how to calculate weights and sizes and how to decide
where and how much to cut and readjust. Finally, this article will
closely examine how all of these considerations play out in the context
of islands, and will focuson some practical issues where further
clarification may be needed.
II.
THE
GENEALOGY
OF
EQUITY
DELIMITATIONS: PARTING THE NORTH SEA

IN

MARITIME

A. The Concerns About the Equidistance-SpecialCircumstances
Formula and the Turn Toward Equity
In North Sea, a divided ICJ boldly played down the role of the

cle.
Major earlier works include CLIVE R. SYMMONS, THE MARTIME ZONES OF ISLANDS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1979 [hereinafter SYMMONS], and DEREK W. BOWETT, THE LEGAL
REGIME OF ISLANDS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1979) [hereinafter BOWETT]. See also
HARITINI DIPLA, LE REGIME JURIDIQUE DES ILES DANS LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA
MER (1984), and HUESEYIN PAZARCI, LA DELIMITATION DU PLATEU CONTINENTAL ET LES
ILES (1982) [hereinafter PAZARCI]. For related chapters in treatises, see M.D. EVANS,
RELEVANT CIRCUMSTATNCES AND MARITIME DELIMITATION (1989), [hereinafter EVANS], at
133-151; R.D. Hodgson, Islands: Normal and Special Circumstances, in LAW OF THE SEA:
THE EMERGING REGIME OF THE OCEANS (J.K. Gamble & G. Pontecorvo, eds. 1974)
[hereinafter Hodgson]; and D.P. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, chaps.
16 & 18 [hereinafter O'CONNELL]. For a comprehensive recent review of state practice,
see Derek W. Bowett, Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-Tide Elevations in Maritime Boundary Delimitations,in I.M.B. 130 - 151 [hereinafter Bowett IMB].
In the periodical literature, special mention should be made to Donald E. Karl, Islands
and the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf-A Framework for Analysis, 71 AM. J. INT'L
L. 642 - 673 [hereinafter Karl], slightly updated in Donald E. Karl, The Delimitation of the
Aegean Continental Shelf. Equitable Principlesand the Problem of Islands, in FOR. POL'Y
INSTIT., THE AEGEAN ISSUES: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (Ankara) [hereinafter Karl, TPI].
6 See for example, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES 2-262 (Jonathan I.
Charney & Lewis M. Alexander eds., 1993) [hereinafter IMB], for a recent composite picture of the issues, factors, and argumentation in the division of maritime spaces, and for
references to the bibliography generally. See Jonathan I. Charney, Progress in International Maritime Boundary DelimitationLaw, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 227-56 (1994) [hereinafter
Charney, Progress], for an update of this work.
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manageable rule of equidistance as the natural law of the continental
shelf,7 a rule which had been incorporated in Article 6 of the Geneva
Convention, modified by the exception of special circumstances. 8 To be
sure, the ICJ recognized its virtues as a convenient method capable of
being employed in almost all circumstances, and stressed that no other
method has the same combination of practical convenience and
certainty of application. 9 However, its utility had to be evaluated each
time, at least in cases of adjacent coasts, under the applicable equitable
principles, in view of all relevant circumstances, in order to reach
reasonable results.
It is not an exaggeration to compare the birth of this marine equity
in North Sea to Athena springing from the head of Zeus without much
gestation. Any conceivable precedent was thin and opaque. Article 6 of
the Geneva Convention, with equidistance as its centerpiece, resulted
from a lengthy and laborious process by the International Law
Commission, and met with world-wide approval, or at least
acquiescence. 10 There had not even been a thought of putting into the
general rule a criterion such as equitable principles because it could not
produce a line on a map. Indeed, the ICJ itself recognized in North Sea
that in the pre-Convention proposals a workable methodology had been
viewed as an essential prerequisite of delimitation." Nevertheless, the
majority focused selectively on a few concerns expressed during the
deliberations, and on the possibility of reservations,12 interpreted the
7. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, paras. 37-46.
8. Examples of such circumstances were the exceptional configuration of the coast,
as well as the presence of small islands or navigable channels. It is apparent that these
examples originated in the traditional law of the territorial sea, where it had been
recognized that the median line could be diverted to preserve the unity of a navigable
channel (thalweg), to ignore uninhabited rocks or islets, or to respect straight baselines or
adjustments in the general direction of the coast. See II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 216, 300
(1953). Such circumstances would operate less forcefully under the regime of the
continental shelf, which does not impose full sovereignty rights and where national
security and navigational considerations are not the main issue.
9. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 22.
10. For a summary of this process, see Evans, supra note 6, at 8-15, and ROBERT D.
HODGSON & ROBERT SMITH, BOUNDARIES OF THE ECONOMIC ZONE IN THE LAW OF THE SEA:
CONFERENCE OUTCOMES AND PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION 183-85 (1977). See also
Etienne Grisel, The Lateral Boundaries of the Continental Shelf and the Judgment of the
InternationalCourt of Justice in the North Sea ContinentalShelf Cases, 64 AM. J. INT'L L.
562, 570-573.
According to Lauterpacht, "It appears that the basis of the Court's approach [that such
delimitations must be established by reference to equitable principles] is a single sentence in a report of a committee of experts [cartographers] nominated by the International
Law Commission in 1953 to provide... technical assistance." Lauterpacht, supra note 4, at
35.
11. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 53.
12. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, paras. 48-55, 62-69. Cf. I 1953 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N
100, 123-126; Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, paras. 22-26; (separate opinion of Judge Sha-
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special circumstances exception as originating in equity,' 3 and jumped
to the conclusion that some undefined equitable principles have always
underlain the regime of the continental shelf, seeking inspiration
directly from them. The main support for this was supposed to be the
Truman Proclamation of 1945 [hereinafter "Declaration"], 14 where the
United States [hereinafter "U.S."] had extended its continental shelf to
200 miles, and had declared that the boundaries with the neighboring
states would be determined on the basis of equitable principles.
However, this blanket unilateral reference to unspecified principles in
the Declaration had been little more that a gesture of reassurance to
the international community that this novel major appropriation of the
open seas will respect the legitimate rights of other states on the basis
5
of equality.1
A good number of the judges in the ICJ expressed their dismay over
this adventure into a process with no discernible practical choices in
sight. 16
Many commentators have also criticized this process.' 7

habuddeen).
13. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 55.
14. Id. paras. 47, 86. See Proc. No. 2667, Policy of the United States With Respect to
the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea-bed of the Continental Shelf, Sept. 28, 1945,
10 Fed. Reg. 12303, 3 C.F.R. 1943-48, Comp., p. 67. See also id. Ammoun, J., separate
opinion, para. 39 for some additional examples. On the evolution of the policy of the
United States, see WHITEMAN, 4 DIG. INT'L L. 752 (1946).
15. Incidentally, the international significance of the Truman Proclamation is quite
limited, since its main purpose was internal, that is to draw a line between federal and
state jurisdiction in this field.

See WOLFGANG FRIEDMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW:

CASES AND MATERIAL 558 (1969); see also Elizabeth M. Borgese, Boom, Doom and Gloom
Over the Oceans, 11 S. DIEGO L. REV. 543 (1974).
16. Judge Tanaka deplored the use of nebulous criteria such as equity or
equitableness, which just beg the question. The rule of law and not anarchy must prevail.
North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, at 172, 185, 195-96. He, as most of the dissenters, favored
equidistance, which is "practical, appropriate, objective and clear," reflecting proximity,
propinquity and contiguity, indeed inherent in the very concept of the continental shelf
and teleologically deducible from it, leading to just and equitable apportionment." Id.. at
180-182, 186.
He was not persuaded that coastal irregularities produce legallyrecognizable distortions. Id. at 186-89. Judge Koretzky was concerned about the
vagueness, subjectiveness and arbitrariness of the term, going beyond the restricted
connotation given to it in the common law countries. The Court should not be addressing
questions of a political nature. Id. at 165-70. Equidistance is the direct and inevitable
consequence of the premises of the continental shelf right. Id. at 158-161. Judge Sorensen
expressed concern that equity breeds uncertainty in "a field where legal certainty is in the
interest not only of the international community in general, but also -on balance- of the
states directly concerned." Id. at 257. For inequity we need a separate standard of
evaluation Id. at 255. Cf. Ammoun, J., separate opinion, at 32 (stating that "the
Judgment arrives at the obvious truth that it is necessary to be just, and does not give
much indication to the parties, each of whom considers that its own position is equitable.")
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However lacking in authentication, was this recourse to equity in North
Sea at least wise like Athena and helpful in resolving disputes fairly?
The ICJ cited three basic ideas for the delimitation of the continental
shelf: (1) negotiate in good faith to reach an agreement; (2) do not
encroach on natural prolongation; and (3) apply equitable principles,
taking all circumstances into account and employing appropriate
methods, including equidistance,1 8 in order to arrive at a reasonable
result. 19 The duty to negotiate does not provide much guidance on
content and outcome and the ICJ's attachment to natural prolongation
proved to be futile as will be discussed later. Will the third idea of
equitable principles, relevant circumstances and reasonable results
work?
B. The Difficulties with the Equitable Doctrineof North Sea
1. A Good Beginning: Staying with Equity-Within-the-Law
North Sea started out correctly by providing the proper framework
of the applicable law. The ICJ was indeed committed to the idea that
the most fundamental of all rules of law relating to the continental shelf
was that the entitlement of each state was an extension of its territorial
sovereignty over land, existing inherently ab initio and ipso facto by
virtue of its coastline. 20 A state without a coast has no continental
shelf. 21 Thus, the ICJ disclaimed any intention of using delimitation to
produce just and equitable shares by a wholesale refashioning of nature
or to remedy natural inequalities. 22 Marine equity did not implicate
either abstract justice2 3 or results ex aequo et bono.24 In other words,
the ICJ unequivocally limited itself to equity within the law,
disclaiming any recourse to equity as fountainhead of the law, or as the
source of just results directly rather than through positive law. Equity
within the law denotes a method of effectuating the law necessitated by
the priority of first principles over rules, and by the impossibility of

17. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 219-228 (1994) [hereinafter
HIGGINS]; EVANS, supra note 5, at 241; Jennings, supra note 4, at 27, 31-35; Michel
Virally, Panoramade Droit InternationalContemporain, in 5 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE
HAGUE ACADEMY 157-160; Wolfgang Friedman, The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases: A
Critique, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 229, at 236.
18. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 85.
19. Id. para. 90.
20. Id. para. 19.
21. Id. para. 91.
22. Id. paras. 18-19, 39, 91.
23. Id. para. 85. See also para. 32 (Ammoun, J., separate opinion).
24. Id. para. 88. Cf. para. 84.
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anticipating a total solution for every conceivable situation because of
the complexity of facts and the generality of rules.
North Sea was on solid ground by distancing itself from any form of
equity without the law. No international tribunal has ever asserted
general authority to use equity on its own to make law, or to contradict
the positive law. 25 Many commentators have eloquently exposed the
perversions of instant, instinctive judicial justice, no matter how wellintentioned, 26 and they need no belaboring here. The practice of
visceral jurisprudence is particularly objectionable in international
adjudication, where states zealously protect their sovereignty.
No
central government is entrusted with a general police power and armed
with an executive branch. The tribunals have no general jurisdiction to
remedy the ills of society, but are under a strict obligation not to make
policy, but only to apply the existing law within the narrow terms of the
submission of the dispute before them. In this environment, equity
27
cannot be a roguish thing measured by the chancellor's foot.
The most authoritative international text on treaty interpretation,
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [hereinafter the "Vienna

25. The ICJ even avoids referring to any equitable power praeter legem, i.e. merely to
supplement and fill in the gaps of the law, let alone contra legem. It is also clear that
whatever international equity may be relevant, it has never taken the coloration of mercy,
or a similar notion of benevolence. On the other hand, international law itself admits,
under the rubric of autonomy of the parties, broad authority to contending parties to
avoid its permissive, substantive norms and select criteria which may be extra-legal, e.g.,
the relative interests, needs and aspirations of the parties or quasi-legal, and/or to bypass
its adjudiciatory procedures and submit their dispute to an agreed-upon process. Article
38 (2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice recognizes that the Court has ex
aequo et bono power based on prorogation, although it has not as yet exercised it for failure of submissions. The reasons for such action may vary: considerations of expediency,
when coupled with trust in the wisdom and impartiality of the decision maker, may support a speedy, informal process; mediation and reconciliation without adversarial argumentation may be deemed more suitable to the preservation of long-term relationships; or
even the law on a particular point may not be sufficiently developed and articulated as
yet, and the dispute cannot be postponed. In terms of format, an equitable decision of this
type may contain only an operative part of just results perceived directly, or it may also
include the reasoning that led to it. The necessity for this kind of a process is even
greater in international than in domestic law, both because of the greater gaps within it,
and because of the failure of most states to accept generally the compulsory jurisdiction of
international tribunals, leaving negotiation as the only other alternative when international law appears to favor one of the parties.
26. See, e.g., RONALD DWARKIN , LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); D.N. Mac Cormick, Formal
Justice and the Form of Legal Argument, in ETUDES DE LOGIQUE JURIDIQUE 103-118
(Chaim Perelman, ed. 1976); LON N. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-38, 96-108, 145163 (1969); JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 46-47
(SPENCER W. SYMONS, Ed., 5th Ed. 1941);. RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL
DECISION 60 (1961). Cf. John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 1924.
27. THE TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDON 61 (Samuel Harvey Reynolds ed., 1892).
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Convention"],28 contains no explicit reference to anything resembling
29
fountainhead or direct-results equity.
2. Trouble Starts : How Can Equity-Within-the-Law Help Here?
(a) The Need for Particularization
The ICJ was aware that the mere invocation of equity was not
enough and that a particularization and a practical approach were
necessary:
[I]t is a truism to say that the determination must be equitable;.. .it
would.. .be insufficient simply to rely on the rule of equity without
giving some degree of indication as to the possible ways in which it
30

might be applied in the present case.

For this task, the long history of equity within-the-law could have
helped. Such equity, which goes at least as far back as Aristotle, has
influenced legal practice through the Roman praetors and the English
chancellors for many centuries, and has found its way into the modern
codifications. In operation, it appears within positive law in the form at
the one end of overiding general principles and at the other of
particularizing interpretations, respectively preceding and following the
formal, strict and general rules. Another main function of such equity
is procedural, aiming to devise remedies giving fuller effect to the
norms of positive law.

28. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/27, 8 I.L.M. 679.
29. Of course, it is possible for nations to transfer international-law-making powers
to international organizations, as was done to a very limited extent with the United Nations. In recent years, a noble but controversial and inconclusive attempt to construct a
new economic order, pursued mostly through the U.N. General Assembly, has invoked
some equity in the international distribution of wealth. At this stage, however, such equity has not taken a concrete form, but remains an aspirational and abstract goal of
states seeking to create advantageous relations in the future through multilateral agreement. See generally Ian Brownlie, Legal Status of Natural Resources in International
Law (Some Aspects), in 162 HAGUE COLLECTED COURSES 245, 245-318 (1980); MOHAMMED
BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 127; ROSSI, supra note 4,
at 199-204. See also M.W. Janis, The Ambiguity of Equity in International Law, 9
BROOK.LYN J. INT'L LAW 16, 16-22 (1983).
A similar invocation at a comparable level of futurism has been included in the U.N.
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
Nov. 12, 1979, U.N. Doc. A/34/664, 18 I.L.M. 1434 (equitable sharing in the benefits derived from outer space resources giving special consideration to the interests and needs of
developing countries). See also Convention on InternationalLiability for Damage Caused
by Space Objects, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 702 (1972).
30. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 92.
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Translating these intangible qualities into working tools of the
legal process, however, remains a most difficult process. The primary
danger is that equity will be transformed from a Panacea to a Pandora:
the gods would have given her a box containing not only all the gifts of
the world, flexibility and fairness, but also the winds of its destruction
through variability and arbitrariness, the two implacable enemies of
justice through law. In other words, the invocation of equity within the
law is not equivalent to a talismanic incantation to be followed by
whatever outcome a court wants to adopt. On the contrary, it must be
accompanied by a detailed, reasoned explanation, available for scrutiny,
of why a literal application of a rule is excessive, insufficient or
inconsistent by reference to its purpose or comes into conflict with an
identifiable overriding principle, coupled in each instance with a
justification of the proposed deviation or supplementation as the best
rectification of the perceived defect. In addition, any creative remedy
must be justified as a better technique of effectuating the purpose of the
law.
The problems of using equity in international dispute resolution
have been noted in the masterful study of C. Wilfred Jenks, who
reviewed arbitral practice and cautioned that equity's role was qualified
by four limiting factors. First, equity has been applied in claims cases
related primarily to loss and damage incurred by private persons who
are desirous of financial compensation rather than to the larger issues
which may arise in the course of international adjudication. Second,
there have been serious ambiguities relating to interpretation and to
hierarchy between equity and the other sources of international law.
Third, the actual performance of tribunals whose mandates included
reference to equity has been less than satisfactory. Fourth, it is not
31
clear whether and how particular decisions did in fact apply equity.
Against this background, the ICJ in North Sea was required to
proceed cautiously to devise a delimitation formula which was
consistent with the continental shelf positive right as the ICJ perceived
it. Given the prevalence of equidistance, the ICJ had to explain why
the exceptional adjustment through the special circumstances window
The
was insufficient to take care of any equitable concerns.
combination of a presumptive rule with a qualified exception is quite
32
common in legal texts, subject to standard methods of interpretation.
31. C. WILFRED JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 335-336,
411-412 (1964). For the limited use of equity in international arbitration; see also ROSSI,
supra note 4, at 59-86; Lapidoth, supra note 4, at 166-168; Louis F.E. Goldie, Reconciling
Values of Distributive Equity and Management Efficiency in the InternationalCommons,
in THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES ON THE NEW NATURAL RESOURCES 335, 338-339 (ReneJean Dupuy ed., 1983); and George Schwarzenberger, Equity in International Law, in
1972 Y.B. WORLD AFF. 346-369.
32. See Anglo-French Arbitration, 16 I.L.M. 54, para. 126, pointing out that under
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Unfortunately, this was not done in any systematic, principled and
articulate way. We must not hesitate to criticize the ICJ for this
failure, which has burdened the delimitation process ever since. Let us
take up the three equitable considerations, principles, circumstances
and results, proposed by the ICJ in North Sea separately, starting with
equitable principles.
(b) What Equitable Principles?
The idea that there are some fundamental maxims within a legal
system which may qualify positive legal rights is well established. 33
More to the point, it would appear that international law itself
incorporates such principles either inherently or through the general
principles of law of nations. Indeed, we do sometimes find references to

customary international law, the burden of proof of the existence and importance of "special circumstances" lies on their proponent (Briggs, J., separate declaration). The distinction is important and supports the primary status of equidistance.
33. In Roman law, the effects of fraud, duress and mistake in transactions were negated through equitable principles. These principles also included notions such that voluntary transactions should be interpreted and implemented in good faith, and the intention of the parties should prevail even if there are irregularities as to form (doctrine of
bonitary ownership and enforcement of the fideicommisum); that unjust enrichment must
be reversed; that a condition of rebus sic standibus should be implied in bargains; and
that unconscionably unequal bargains should not be enforced (doctrine of laesio enormis).
See Peter Stein, Equitable Principles in Roman Law, in EQUITY IN THE WORLD'S LEGAL
SYSTEMS 75 (1973).
The prevailing terminology in the Roman, and later in the Germanic, legal systems quite
often avoided the word "equity" in these contexts, referring instead to "the general principles of law." A typical and central example of such principle is the notion dolus omnia
currumpit (fraud corrupts all), which tempers the strict norms of pacta sunt servanda
(promises must be kept), and caveat emptor (let the buyer beware).
By and large, modern continental legislators have enacted most of these innovations into
positive law, and even have incorporated and expanded the foundational principles themselves, e.g. through the doctrine of "abuse of right," within the codes, especially the Civil
Codes and the Codes of Civil Procedure, so that now not only is their legitimacy beyond
question, but also the reconciliation between the spirit and the letter of the law has become mandatory.
It is these general principles that were at the heart of equity practice in England over the
centuries, and were later exported to the four corners of the Anglo-American world. Indeed, there are striking parallels between the principles of Roman aequitas and those of
English equity. To the preceding enumeration, the clearer protection in English Equity of
reliance interests through the concept of estoppel and the crystallization of various maxims such the clean hands doctrine, the reciprocity notion articulated under the tenant of
discussion of "he who seeks equity must do equity" and the like. For a fuller discussion of
the operation of equitable principles in both systems, see Ralph A. Newman, Equity in
Comparative Law, 17 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 807, 807-48 (1968). See generally Ralph A.
Newman, Equity in the Law of the United States, in EQUITY IN THE WORLD'S LEGAL
SYSTEMS 82-109 (1973).
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equitable maxims and to doctrines such as estoppel, unjust enrichment,
clean hands, laches, non-contradiction, and prevalence of substance
Equity's locus classicus in international law is the
over form.
opinion of Judge Manley Hudson in Diversion of
separate
celebrated
Water from the River Meuse,34 where he referred to the hardly
controversial principle of equality between the parties, and where he
applied the equitable doctrine of clean hands (or 'he who seeks equity
must do equity') to reject the Dutch claim. 35 The task of the ICJ in
North Sea on this issue, therefore, was to name, to defend and to apply
any equitable principles or maxims relevant to delimitations. Quite
appropriately, the ICJ in fact did consider the possibility of using of
estoppel against Germany, but found that there was no factual support
for it.36 The only other equitable principle that qualified and that the
ICJ considered was "equality." The ICJ refered to the obvious notion
that equal things should be treated equally, but at this level of
generality this meant little more than that equal coasts should get
equal shares of shelf. This begged the questions of what makes one
coast equal to another, and of how this equality is to be implemented in
drawing the lines. The ICJ gave a major clue by treating equidistance
as appropriate for states with opposite coasts because basically it
produces an "equal division of the particular area involved." 37 What
then made the results of equidistance unequal in adjacencies? Since
equality cannot operate in a vacuum, it was then incumbent on the ICJ
to identify those features of the coast (the source of the right) that were
relevant to delimitation, and that distinguished opposite from adjacent
coasts. This meant that a prior particularizing interpretation of the
continental shelf right was needed. In other words, a second-level
equitable operation had to be conducted.
That equitable principles by themselves offered no help here should
come as no surprise. Their typical function is to limit the excessive or
inappropriate exercise of already existing rights, not to define and to
delineate them in the first place. 38 The basic irrelevance of free-range
34. Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Neth. v. BeIg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No.
70, at 76-78 (June 28).
35. The clean-hands principle surfaced later in decisions such as Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 393-394 (June 27) (Judge Schwebel dissenting). A similar kind of equity surfaces in international arbitration, where the compromis sometimes refers the conjunctive or disjunctive to "justice," "equity," "public law,"
"good faith," or even "international law" or the "law of the nations." For examples, see
MIYOSHI, supra note 4, at 21-70.
36. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 30. See generally I.C. MacGibbon, Estoppel in InternationalLaw, 7 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 512 (1958).
37. Id. paras. 57, 79-80.
38. While "equity" in general is not recognized as a formal source of international
law, and has been deliberately excluded from Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, we do encounter in the cases some references to the general
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equitable principles in maritime delimitations has now been confirmed
by UNCLOS. The formula that eventually found its way into Articles
74(1) and 83(1) speaks of delimitations:
on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the

maxims of equitable nature. For an overview, see Mark W. Janis, Equity in International
Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 109 (1992). See also Rothpfeffer,
supra note 4, at 82-87; OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
49-65 (1991); Michael Akehurst, Equity and General Principlesof Law, 25 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 801, 808-825 (1976); Mark W. Janis, The Ambiguity of Equity in InternationalLaw, 9
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 7, 8-13 (1983); and Lapidoth, supra note 4, passim. For an admiring
view, see Louis B. Sohn, The Role of Equity in the Jurisprudence of the International
Court of Justice, in MELANGES GEORGES PERRIN 303-312 (B. Dutoit & E. Grisel eds.,
1984). Whether such maxims have already become part of customary international law or
keep finding their way into international law through the gate of the general principles
recognized by the nations of the world is an interesting theoretical question with little
practical consequence here. Another such question is whether these maxims trace their
roots to the venerable common law (and Roman law) tradition of equity. While this ancestry is historically more than obvious, it is technically correct to say that the search for
them is not confined to such tradition. See ROSSI, supra note 4, at 121-124.
Sections 102 and 903 of the recent RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAw OF THE UNITED STATES (1987) contain some typically ambiguous language on these
theoretical issues. Section 102, Sources of International Law, Comment (in) reads as follows:
Equity as a generalprinciple. Reference to principles of equity, in the
sense of what is fair and just, is common to major legal systems, and
equity has been accepted as a principle of international law in several
contexts [giving, however, only the example of maritime delimitations]. That principle is not to be confused with references to "equity"... in traditional Anglo-American jurisprudence ....
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987),
cmt. m. See § 903, Reporters' Note 9.
Reporters' Note 9 to 102 recognizes, however, that: "The principle of equity is frequently
invoked in discourse between states but there are few references to equity as a legal principle in international judicial decisions" [citing only the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case of
1974 and the maritime delimitations]." In addition, in Reporters' Note 9 to 903, it is
stated that a decision ex aequo et bono:
should be distinguished from application by the Court of the basic
principles of equity that are part of customary international law ....
In two cases related to maritime boundaries [Tunisia-Libya and LibyaMalta], the Court was authorized by the parties to apply, and did apply, equitable principles.
This language raises more questions than it answers. Is there one principle of equity or
many principles of equity? Beyond the "fair and just" truism, are there any special characteristics of equity as to content and function? Indeed, is there any difference between
legal and equitable principles? Is party agreement required for the application of equitable principles? Be that as it may, there is little doubt that certain general maxims,
whether labeled "legal" or "equitable", do apply in international adjudication. What is
important here is to get an understanding of the nature and scope of these principles or
maxims and of their function within international law.
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International ICJ of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.
Thus, the high winds 39 of equitable principles, that risked
mistaking "obscurity for profundity, '40 blew away.
(c) What Relevant Circumstances and Reasonable Results?
Perhaps the next considerations, relevant circumstances and
reasonable results, can help particularize our interpretation by
identifying those particular features of the coasts that matter so that
equality has something to measure and to calculate.
Aristotle was the first major philosopher to propose and to explain
how this type of particularizing equitable process works. The notion of
equity (epeikeia) as an enemy or an antagonist of the law is alien to
Aristotle. Equity is not better than the law, but only better law. 41
Equity goes beyond the words of the statute only to make redress of its
imperfection traceable to its generality, 42 which is inevitable because it
is virtually impossible to draft a text which will anticipate all potential
sets of facts. 43 Equity only puts the law on the intended track; it does
44
not correct it.
The exercise of discretion is perverted where it leads to
deliberate departures from the law, and to the substitution of
unmediated intuitions.
The ideal statute should aim to cover
everything, leaving as little discretion as possible to those who apply
45
it.
Thus, Aristotle views the judges not as creators of substantive law
through equity, but only as procedural effectuators of pre-existing
norms.
Aristotle falls back to his famous doctrine of teleological
interpretation on the crucial question of how to make the transition
from the generality and incompleteness of the law to the appropriate
specific rule and to a reasonable result. The rule is but an instrument
for the implementation of a purpose. Its spirit may be discovered by

39. St. Pierre & Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. at 1212, para. 36 (Weil, J., dissenting opinion).
40. Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. at 139, (Shahabuddeen, J., separate opinion).
41. Aristotle, Ethics, in COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE E. 14.1137b. 9 (Jonathan
Barnes ed., 1984) [hereinafter Aristotle, Ethics].
42. Id. at 27.
43. Id. at 14-15. CompareAristotle, Rhetoric, in COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE A.
13.1374a. 26-33 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) [hereinafter Aristotle,Rhetoric] with Aristotle, Politics, in COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE C. 12.1282b. 1, C. 16.1287a. 23 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) [hereinafter Aristotle, Politics] ("[Tihe judges should decide about]
what the statutes are incapable of covering with precision because it is not easy to cover
everything through general rules").
44. Aristotle-Politics, supra note 43, at 12-13, 22, 26. See also Aristotle-Rhetoric, supranote 43.
45. See Aristotle, Rhetoric, supra note 43, at 1353b. 31-33. Cf.Plato, Laws, 820.C &
934.B; Plato, Politics,291 & 295.
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focusing "not on the statute but on the legislator; not on the words but
on the mind of the legislator; not on the act but on the intention; not on
the part but on the whole."46 This search for purpose and for context
does not stop at the specific statute (equity of the statute), but extends
to the legal system as a whole.
Aristotelian teleology opened the door beyond the letter of the rules
to the overall requirement of crafting specific remedies in order to give
the purpose of the law its fullest effectuation. This was at the heart of
subsequent equitable practice. 47 Aristoteleian epieikeia and the Roman
and Anglo-American practice point the way to the proper uses of equity
within international law. No lesser authority than Hugo Grotius
48
thought of equity in the same spirit.
The Vienna Convention uses a similar
interpretation. Article 31.1 provides that:

process

in

treaty

A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in light of its object and purpose.
Article 31.2 defines context very narrowly to cover prior related
language and action by the parties, and Article 31.3-4 gives weight to
subsequent actions and expressed intentions of the parties as well as to
46. Aristotle-Ethics,supra note 41, at E. 1374b. 11-15.
47. The Roman classical aequitas codified into a jus honorarium the extraordinary
remedies developed through the praetorianformulae. The rigidity and technicality of the
jus civile, which recognized only one form of legis actio, was moderated by the judicial
creation of additional remedies. These were either supplementary and more convenient,
(specific performance and additional remedies to recover possession), or novel, (enforcing
the possessory rights not only of an owner but also of a pledge-creditor), or even creative
(recognizing the rights of legatees under an informal will as against the heirs in intestacy). See H.F. Jolowicz, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION To THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 98
(1952). See also Sir Henry Maine, ANCIENT LAW 618-22 (1931).
In all these instances, the extraordinary remedy was intended to give effect either to the
purpose of the related rule or to reflect certain principles that permeated the entire legal
system. In England, as concerns remedies, the rigidity of the writs and forms of action
was moderated by the availability of a host of forms of relief, (specific performance, rescission, reformation, restitution, constructive trust, accounting) including orders which restrained the person, such as injunctions and mandates, rather than remedies that were
enforceable only against property. See HAROLD GREVILLE HANBURY & RONALD HARLING
MAUDSLEY, MODERN EQUITY 3-45 (13th ed. 1985); and J.H. BAKER, INTRODUCTION TO
ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 83-100 (2d ed. 1979), for an overview regarding legal remedies.
48. The letter of the law must be adjusted to reflect its purpose when it becomes defective in application because of its generality:
For since all cases can neither be foreseen nor expressed, there is necessity for some liberty for excepting cases which he who has spoken
would except if he were present. But this is not to be done rashly; (for
that would be for the interpreter to determine the acts of another); but
on sufficient indications.
HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS, BOOK TWO, ch. xvi, para. 26 (1901).
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the relevant rules of international law (broader context). Other than
plain meaning and context, this language at most imports good faith
and teleology, but does not give free-wheeling authority to resort to
some form of generic justice or equity.
In this spirit, before a feature of the coast can be characterized as
relevant, and before a result can be qualified as reasonable, they must
be connected to the source of the right, the coastal extension of
territorial sovereignty. Likewise, the sole ultimate requirement in
UNCLOS of an equitable solution suggests again that any particular
rules should not be applied blindly ignoring or contradicting the basic
49
concept and purpose of the related maritime rights.
In delimitations, it bears repeating that we are dealing with a
limited, geography-based, property-type right existing ab initio and ipso
facto. The sole issue is appurtenance to a coast. Any form of
distributive justice has no place here, and the invocation of some
magical equity is hardly useful.Occasionally, we also see the exercise of
some remedial discretion in determining the amount of damages or
reasonable compensation for claims of loss or nationalization. 50
(d) Equidistance Versus Natural Prolongation, Natural
Resources and Coastal Length
The ICJ in North Sea identified three items which could have
qualified as potentially relevant objective features of the coast, and
therefore could be treated as relevant circumstances : 1) undersea
continuation of the land mass (natural prolongation, especially geology
and geomorphology); 2) the location of natural resources; and 3) length
of the coastal front. In the abstract, all of these features could have
been evaluated in equity as against the distance from the coastline
criterion, which undergirds equidistance, in terms of the essense and
purpose of the continental shelf right. In the concrete case factual
matrix of North Sea, however, it was quite apparent that only the
coastal length factor had to be weighed against equidistance. Indeed,
the only concern of the ICJ was that under equidistance, Germany, a
state with a sea frontage comparable in length to that of the two
adjacent states, 51 would get a much smaller and grossly
49. The term 'reasonable' result used in North Sea is more apt than 'equitable' solution as it suggests more clearly the instrumental function of testing the outcome against
the purpose and nature of the right, rather than evaluating it under some external or
subjective criteria. But see North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, at 36 (Ammoun, J., separate opinion)
(criticizing this resort to the morally neutral notion of 'reasonable').
50. See Rossi, supra note 5, at 81-83; Thomas M. Franck & Dennis M. Sughrue, The
InternationalRole of Equity-as-Fairness,81 GEO. L.J. 563, 564-569 (1993); Lapidoth, supranote 5, at 167-169.
51. ROSsI, supra note 5, at 89, 91, 98.
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disproportionate share because of its concavity. 52 This is because
simple distance automatically magnifies the slightest irregularity of the
coastline in adjacent delimitations.5 3 The greater the irregularity and
the greater the distance the more unreasonable the results.5 4 This
exaggeration of the consequences of geography created distortions
leading to inequity. 55 Thus, the ICJ was persuaded that the surfacedistance-proximity 56 approach did not fully incarnate here the
legitimate projections of the coast. It is these distortions that should be
corrected by searching for a reasonable result, taking into account the
relevant circumstances. 57 The coast-length proportionality correction
would have completely taken care of the ICJ's concerns, and there was
no need to refer to anything else.5 8 But the majority insisted on
addressing all three considerations, and most of the North Sea opinion
is in the nature of dicta, and confusing dicta at that.
First, the ICJ's fixation on an undefined concept of natural
prolongation 59 created considerable ambiguity in an area where
guidelines were needed. Furthermore, treating natural prolongation as
a separate consideration outside the equitable formula, thus suggesting
a two-track approach, added another burdensome layer to the process.
Second, the reference to the unity of the deposits of the shelf to avoid
prejudicial or wasteful exploitation of straddling resources 60 as
something to negotiate about, 61 maked good practical sense. However,
it was accompanied by an ambiguous statement suggesting that where
52. See for example, Thomas M. Frank & Dennis M. Sughrue, The InternationalRole
of Equity-as-Fairness,81 GEO. L.J. 563, 576-580 (1993); Paul Reuter, Quelques reflections
sur l'equite en droit international, 15 REV. BELGE DR. INT'L 165, 174-75 (1980), for the
view that proportionality is the only legacy of North Sea.
53. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 87.
54. Id. Germany had produced a chart showing that a 100-mile straight coast, which
under equidistance normally would have received five times as much continental shelf as
a parallel, equally straight coast of 20 miles to 200 miles, would lose close to 1/3 of it
(about 6,000 square miles) if the latter coast had just a five mile protruding headland.
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger. v. Den./Neth.) 1993 I.C.J. Pleadings 2, 29.
55. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, paras. 89(a), 91.
56. See id. paras. 39-43 (discussing the not always clear distinction between 'adjacency' and 'proximity').
57. Id. para. 90.
58. Some of the judges held even stronger and clearer views about this being the key
corrective factor to equidistance. See id. para. 15 (Morelli, J., dissenting) (stating that a
remarkable disproportion' between length of coastline and continental shelf share is of a
gravely inequitable nature'); id. para. 4 (Bustamante y Rivero, J., separate opinion)
(wishing that proportionality be treated not just as a factor but as an obligatory principle,
and he would have also counted as part of the shelf the seabed under the territorial sea).
See id. at 92 (Nervo, J., separate opinion); see id. paras. 43, 51, 56 (Ammoun, J., separate
opinion).
59. Id. para. 85.
60. Id. para. 97.
61. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 97; see also id. paras. 94, 95, 101(a)-(d).
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the areas appertaining to the parties where resources are located
overlap, failing agreement, either such areas must be divided equally or
they must be jointly explored, especially to preserve the unity of a
deposit. 62 Some judges disagreed, denying that the location of seabed
resources has anything to do with the lines of demarcation; 63 this is
generally supported by state practice. 64 Now the voluntary joint
The
exploration of straddling deposits presents no problems. 65
alternative language about equal division, however, certainly cannot
mean that when there are deposits anywhere in the overlapping areas,
they should be divided in such a way as to attribute them in shares
equal in size. 66 If that were the case, a tiny island facing a large
landmass would get up to half of the deposits and possible shelf, which
is a reductio ad absurdum. The plausible way to read this contextually
is to connect it to the ICJ's commitment to natural prolongation. Where
natural prolongations overlap and where resources are located within
this overlap, they should be divided equally. Third, by understating the
importance and the sufficiency of the coast-length proportionality
adjustment, which would have taken care completely of its concerns in
the case, the ICJ was led to overstate the shortcomings of equidistance
and thus justify letting loose the genie of equity tout court. Fourth, the
suggestion that there was no limit to the potentially relevant
considerations in such a concrete field of law generated doubts on
whether we were not turning to abstract and distributive justice after
all, despite loud disclaimers, rather than applying the standard
interpretive particularization that was really needed.
Backing out of the commitment to a futile search for natural
prolongation was relatively easy and painless for the courts, and does
not deserve much comment. However, finding the way out of the
doctrinal imbroglio generated by the high-sounding but diverting

62. Id. paras. 99, 101 (c)(1-2), see also id. para. 101(d)(2) (identifying natural resources as a factor to be taken into account).
63. The location of natural resources is in principle irrelevant unless 'decisive circumstances' require otherwise. They are a 'disturbing factor to the detriment of equity'.
Id. para. 5 (Bustamante y Rivero, J., separate opinion). Submarine resources are irrelevant. Taking these resources into account in the drawing of boundaries would amount to
an apportionment of the shelf, not its delimitation. Id. para. 53 (Ammoun, J., separate
opinion). See also id. at 168 (Koretsky, J., dissenting opinion).
64. Barbara Kwiatkowska, Economic and Environmental Consideration in Maritime
Boundary Delimitations,in IMB. 75, 106-07. (1993)[hereinafter Kwiatkowska].
65. See Bletcher, supra note 5, at 65. For examples of related state practice, see
Kwiatkowska, supra note 64, at 86-96.
66. See Ammoun, J., separate opinion, North Sea, 169 I.C.J. 3, para. 51 and Koretzky, J., dissenting opinion, Id. para. 168. Cf. Gulf of Maine 1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 195
and Munkman at 91. Only Jessup, J. argued expressly in favor of the general 'principle' of
joint exploitation not only of resources extending across a boundary line but also of those
lying in still undeliminated areas. Id. para. 82 (Jessup, J., separate opinion).
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references to equity has proven extraordinarily difficult. Indeed, the
best that has been accomplished even to the present day is not express
disavowal but simple shrinkage of equitable discussion to the vanishing
point. In the next sections, I will first give samples of the misbegotten
equitable doctrine of the post-North Sea cases. Then I will show how
the courts were generally successful over time and place in overcoming
it. Finally, through the interpretive particularization of an already
defined and strict regime of continental shelf and exclusive zone, I will
convert the concepts into lines on the map. Equidistance reemerged as
the dominant method in fact, if not in law, and all competing
considerations other the length of the coastal fronts were rejected on
short order. State practice by and large followed a similar path.
III. STRUGGLING WITH EQUITABLE DOCTRINE IN THE
DELIMITATION CASES AFTER NORTH SEA
In the seven important cases following the North Sea adjudication,
culminating with St. Pierre & Miquelon and Jan Mayen, the courts
persisted in the unequivocal rejection of any intention to refashion
geography, to share resources or to depart from the coastal front. At
the same time, the pattern of ritualistically proclaiming the importance
of equitable principles and of relevant circumstances, and of pursuing
equitable results within the law, or any combination thereof, continued.
The connection, however, between these doctrinal positions and the
outcomes was anything but clear. Let us focus now on the equitable
doctrine of these cases.
Eight years after North Sea, in the Anglo-French Arbitration, the
ICJ, invoking relevant circumstances and equitable principles, 67
repeated the proposition that "an equitable delimitation... cannot have
as its object simply the awarding of an 'equitable' share... to each
Party,"68 thus at least suggesting that it was applying only equity
within the law. 69 The ICJ made certain statements that sounded too
close to 'I know inequity when I see it,'70 without connecting them to the
67. Anglo-French Arbitration, 16 I.L.M. 54, para. 97.
68. Id. para. 78.
69. See also para. 245.
70. "[lit is manifest from a mere glance at the map that... the Channel Islands region presents particular features and problems ....
[Therefore] the equities in the region
[must be balanced]." Id. paras. 180, 187.
For serious criticism of the equitable doctrine of the Court, see Brownlie, supra note 29, at
287:
[The equitable principles of the Court] amount to no more than a bundle of highly impressionistic ideas about the 'distorting effect', socalled, of islands. Employed in this way, 'equitable principles' became
merely faint indication of the reasoning, or the unreasoned premises,
on which judicial discretion can be excused ....
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eventual outcome. Later in Tunisia-Libya, the ICJ had been invited "to
take account of equitable principles and the relevant circumstances
which characterize the area, as well as the recent trends admitted at
the Third.Conference of the Law of the Sea."71 Under this carte blanche,
the ICJ majority, consisting of seven of the thirteen judges, made some
vague statements about the cardinal importance of equitable principles, 72 and about the legal concept of equity being a direct emanation of
the idea of justice, binding on the ICJ as a general principle directly
applicable, but emptying it of content by disassociating it from the
Roman-English tradition. 73 The ICJ continued on this inconclusive
track with the statement that, under equity, "a court may choose among
several possible interpretations of law the one which appears, in the
light of the circumstances of the case, to be closest to the requirements
of justice." 74 But is this not the task of every court applying all law
anyway? Furthermore, how can we give meaning to the requirements
of justice and the circumstances of the case here except by reference to
the preexisting context and the purpose of the law of maritime rights
and delimitations? What do we add or gain by calling this process
equitable? The ICJ ultimately purported to apply equitable principles
seeking equitable results. 75 But how do the principles relate to the
results? Well, here is what has been aptly called by a noted publicist a
startling conclusion76:
The result of the application of equitable principles must be equitable.
This terminology, which is generally used, is not entirely satisfactory
because it employs the term equitable to characterize both the result to
be achieved and the means to be applied to reach this result. It is,
however, the result which is predominant; the principles are
subordinate to the goal. The equitableness of a principle must be
assessed in the light of its usefulness for the purpose of arriving at an
equitable result. It is not every such principle which is in itself
equitable; it may acquire this quality by reference to the equitableness
77
of the solution.

See also Blecher, supra note 5, at 87-88.
71. Tunisia-Libya, 1982 I.C.J. 18, at 21. See, however, the cautious treatment of this
broad mandate by the Court. Id. para. 24.
72. Id. para. 44.
73. Id. para. 71.
74. Id.
75. Id. para. 70.
76. See HIGGINS, supra note 17, at 225. Such language suggests "first the judgment,
then the evidence." Krateros M. Ioannou, Some Preliminary Remarks on Equity in the
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, in THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA 104 (C. L. Rozakis &
C. A. Stephanous, eds. 1983).
77. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahirya), 1982
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Does all of this tell us how to find out whether a result is equitable?
Can it be equitable if it does not derive from equitable principles?
Conversely, is it possible for equitable principles to produce inequitable
results? Well, the ICJ concluded later:
[I]t is clear that what is reasonable and equitable must depend on its particular circumstances. There can be no doubt that it is virtually impossible to
achieve an equitable solution in any delimitation without taking into account
78
the particular relevant circumstances which characterize the area.
The relevant considerations must be balanced up.7 9 Wait a minute!
Are we not back at square one? How do we know through equity what
circumstances are relevant and how much they weigh?80 Dissenting
Judges Oda, Gros and Evensen questioned the meaningful applicability
of such equity in the case. Judge Gros pointed out that North Sea
provided not only a goal, "equitable delimitation.. .which intrinsically is
merely to pose the problem without providing the solution," but also the
rules and methods for reaching it,81 and criticized the ICJ for contenting
itself "with some generalities on the equidistance method without
'8 2
giving the reasons why it would unquestionably 'lead to inequity.
Indeed, "this lack of a systematic search for the equitable has produced
a result the equity of which remains to be proved."8 3 Only the "presence
in the area ... of geographical features, the effect of which is
84
disproportionate to their relevance" should be taken into account.
Judge Evensen quoted Maitland to the effect that "equity came not to
destroy the law but to fulfil it."85 In other words, you cannot use equity
unless there is prior law: "equity principles cannot operate in a
void .... [In North Sea and the Anglo-French Arbitration] the

I.C.J. 18, para. 70.
78. Id. para. 72.
79. Id. para. 71.
80. In his separate opinion in Jan Mayen Judge Weeramantry tried to give an example of an equitable result: equidistance when there is a vast difference in the length of the
coasts. para. 34. See also paras. 35-42. This should instead serve as a perfect example of
why this kind of terminology and distinction is unhelpful. Both from the coast and length
of the coast may be relevant considerations in the delimitation of the continental shelf,
deriving from its very definition. To the extent that they produce different results and
must be balanced up. What does this have to do with equitable principles not producing
equitable results? The confusion inherent in the Weeramantry approach become more
apparent in another of his passages, "The stress upon the need for an equitable solution
and the rejection of any solution which, though reached in accordance with equity, is inequitable, is thus one which has philosophical support." Id. para. 109.
81. Tunisia-Libya, 1982 I.C.J. 18, para. 10. (Gros, J., dissenting opinion).
82. Id. para. 11.
83. Id.
84. Id. para. 13.
85. Id. para. 12 (Evensen, J., dissenting opinion).

1998

LIFTING THE VEILS OF EQUITY

equidistance principle was applied as a juridical starting point for the
application of equity."8 6 Judge Oda characterized the equitable
references as amounting to a truism, to the "principle of non-principle,"
8 7
leading to a line not supported by any considerations.
Gulf of Maine comes next, involving the single boundary of the
continental shelf and the fishery zone between Canada and the United
States [hereinafter U.S.].88 The U.S. argued natural prolongation and
historical fishing, distinguishing also between primary and secondary
coasts. Canada proposed instead equitable equidistance, excluding
certain U.S. coasts, acquiescence and economic repercussions. The
Chamber basically rejected all of these contentions, 89 but could find
nothing specific in international law effectuating the equitable criteria
and methods. 90 For example, the principle that "delimitation must be
effected by agreement or recourse to a third-party" produces no
answers. 91 Well, then, where are we going to find some guidance?
Perhaps in the prior cases and in the literature. But the Chamber was
committed to the idea that "each specific case is, in the final analysis,
'92
different from all the others... it is monotypic.
At the same time, while there has been no systematic definition of
the relevant equitable criteria, here are some examples: (a) the land
dominates the sea; (b) equal division of the areas of overlap; (c) nonencroachment and no cut-off; (d) proportionality to the length of coast
lines; (e) preservation of vital existing fishing patterns; (f) optimum
conservation and management of living resources; and (g) lines which
93
reduce the potential for future disputes.
One thing is immediately apparent.
There is no connection
between these criteria and what is known as equity. Their content is
different from that of the traditional equitable principles, and their
function is neither to override nor to remedy the unintended effects of a
rigid rule. Indeed, they constitute mere attempted particularizations of
the concepts of the maritime zones in question. Incidentally, the

86. Tunisia-Libya, 1982 I.C.J. 18, para. 12.
87. Id. paras. 1, 38, 155 (Oda, J., separate opinion). For a similar view, see Jonathan
Charney, Ocean Boundaries Between Nations, 78 AM. J. INT'L L.582, 586-87. For a detailed exploration of the views of Oda as judge and publicists in this field, see Barbara
Kwiatkowska, Judge Shigeru Oda's Opinion in Law-of-the-Sea Cases: Equitable Maritime
Boundary Delimitation, 15 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 225-294.
88. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, paras. 79, 98-99, 112.
89. Id. paras. 36, 57-59, 104-107, 108, 126-153, 166-172, 178-182, 237-238.
90. Id. paras. 81, 110-111.
91. Id. paras. 90, 112.
92. See Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 81.
93. Id. paras. 110, 157. It is interesting to note that the Chamber treated equidistance not as a principle but only as a method implementing the first two of these principles. Id. paras. 159, 178.
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Chamber recognized real equitable principles in the discussion of
estoppel, acquiescence and modus vivendi.94 Judge Gros was95 quite
eloquent in his doctrinal challenge to this equitable weathervane.
Coming to the equitable solution, the Chamber suggested that the
method itself is not equitable, but solely instrumental. 96 The examples
of method included (a) median line, (b) lateral equidistance, (c) line
perpendicular to the coast where the territories meet, (d) line
perpendicular to the general direction of the coast, (e) boundary
prolonging the existing division of territorial waters, and (f) boundary
prolonging the direction of the final segment of the land boundary or of
its overall direction. 97 Thus, contrary to Libya-Tunisia, the equitable
solution has no meaning of its own, but only effectuates the relevant
criteria. The solution was also subjected to an ultimate test of not being
radically inequitable, meaning "likely to entail catastrophic
repercussions for the livelihood and economic well-being of the
We may again wonder
population of the countries concerned."98
whether anything was gained by using the equitable label. The
Chamber then turned to the old chestnut of looking to the facts and
circumstances of each case. 99 This sounds fine, but what does it mean
that "the equitableness [of a criterion] can only be assessed in relation
to the circumstances of each case, and for one and the same criterion it
is quite possible to arrive at different, or even opposite, conclusions in
different cases?". 10 0 It is all well and good if it refers to the obvious fact
94. Id. para. 152.
95.
[I]f
there is any legal concept to which each attaches his own meaning,
it is equity ... [Elquity does not consist in a successive search for
equality, proportionality, result; each of these considerations is a way
of applying equity, it is a choice made in the manner of applying the
law, and not an accumulation of equities which there is nothing to forbid supplementing with such others as one may glimpse in that frame
of mind. One must not narrow down the law of delimitation to two
words, agreement plus equity, only to equate that with judicial discretion .... By introducing disorder into the conception of equitable
principles, and freedom for the judge to pick and choose relevant circumstances and criteria, the Court [in Tunisia-Libya has], given equity in maritime delimitation this doubtful content of indeterminate
criteria, methods and corrections which are now wholly resultoriented .... Equity discovered by an exercise of discretion is not a
form of application of law ... It is no more conclusive to say that a result is equitable than to say that it is just, if the judge doe not refer to
an order of equity or justice.
Id. paras. 27, 29, 37, 39.
96. Id. para. 199. See generally id. paras. 159, 191.
97. Id. para. 159.
98. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 237.
99. Id. para. 158. See generally id. para. 81.
100. Id. para. 158.
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that the same criterion may produce different outcomes in different
circumstances, and if the Chamber had in mind such truisms as, for
example, that short coasts generate shorter shelves than longer coasts
or that a criterion that deals with islands is irrelevant in an island-free
delimitation. But we must raise an eyebrow if the idea is that the very
same criterion, for example, proportionality or even more specific ones
such as 'the land dominates the sea' is sometimes equitable and
sometimes not. Such statements would not only be implausible but also
circuitous and question-begging.
Obviously, we would then need
another set of standards to help us decide what makes a particular
criterion equitable in a particular context. It is also disturbing that the
Chamber, in the same spirit of doctrinal escape, emphasized that
maritime delimitations are monotypical, which "preclude[s] the
possibility of those conditions arising which are necessary for the
formation of principles and rules of customary law giving specific
provisions for subjects like those just mentioned."' 01
In Guinea-Guinea/Bissau, two neighboring African states
submitted to arbitration the delimitation of their three maritime zones
by a single line. Natural prolongation, 10 2 old treaties, 10 3 economic
factors and security' 04 were conceded or found irrelevant.
The
submission called for the application of international law, and it was
agreed that the key objective was to find an equitable solution. 10 5 How
can this be achieved? This can be achieved by recourse to "factors and
methods based on considerations of law."' 0 6 Which ones? The Tribunal
merely emphasized that each case of delimitation is a unicum, and
07
referred to the "characteristics peculiar to the region."'
In Libya-Malta, the standard was the "rules and principles of
international law."' 08
Libya argued that this means equitable
principles, relevant circumstances and equitable results which in this
case led to natural prolongation and reasonable proportionality to
coastlines. 0 9 Malta countered with "international law in order to
achieve an equitable solution," which in this case translated to
equidistance. 1 0
In terms of doctrine, this is a landmark case because the ICJ finally

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. para. 81.
Id. paras. 116-117. See generally id. para. 19.
Id. para. 86.
Id. paras. 121-24.
Id. para. 89.
Id.
Id.
See Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J. at 16.
Id. at 19.
Id.
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began the process of extrication from the morass of equitable theory."'
To be sure, it started with certain banal quotes about equity from North
Sea and Tunisia-Libya.112 In the same breadth, however, in some
memorable phrases, the ICJ transcended them and stressed the need
both for predictability and for reasoned decision-making, thus
rehabilitating the importance of recognizable principles of general
application and raising doubts about the uniqueness of each case and
the possibility of seeking equity through ad hoc results. 11 3 The ICJ also
rejected the notion that: "[T]here is no legal limit to the considerations
[which may be taken into account]. . . it is evident that only those that
are pertinent to the institution of the continental shelf ... will qualify
for inclusion.' ' 114 Some of the other judges also strongly supported these
views. Some judges even held the opinion that the majority did not go
far enough. 115 The decision was accompanied by voluminous separate
and dissenting opinions and declarations." 6 Finally, the ICJ made clear
that these so-called maritime equitable principles are mostly negative,
saying no more than do not mess with geography: do not refashion
geography, do not compensate for the inequalities of (objective) nature,
do not engage in distributive justice, and do not encroach on another's
shelf. 117 Furthermore, the equality of states does not mean equal shares
of shelf, 118 and neither natural prolongation nor economic factors
count." 9
The impact of the redescription of the issues in Libya-Malta in
111. Id. paras. 26-29.
112. Id. para. 45.
113. Id. paras. 45-46, 76.
114. Id. para. 48.
115. "The judicial task is to make the law more determinable by objective criteria, and
thus make more predictable to potential parties ....
Facts and circumstances to be taken
into consideration must be as objective an intelligible as possible." Id. para. 114 (Mosler,
J., dissenting opinion.). Judge Oda suggested that referring to equitable principles, equitable results and relevant circumstances 'merely amounts to an uninformative rearrangement of the terms of the. .. question." Equity "at most...can be held to proscribe the
frame of mind in which the negotiators should approach their task." Id. para. 33 (Oda, J.,
dissenting opinion). Marine Equity is not a means of pursuing world social justice. Id.
para. 66. Judges Rouda, Bejaoui, and de Arechaga, had the following reflections in their
separate opinions on the "praetorian subjectivism" of the equity in maritime delimitations: '[The] "fundamental norm" ... of the equitable result.. is as uninstructive as it is
all embracing .... [E]quity.. though a highly respective legal concept is inequitably
measured with a "human" yardstick... and remains mysterious.' Id. para. 37. On the
other hand, Judge Sette-Camara, in a separate opinion, was not comfortable with this
"over conceptualization of the application of principles." Id. at 63.
116. Seventeen judges sat on the case. Six judges wrote or supported separate
opinions, three judges filed dissenting opinions and there was one declaration. Thus, the
main opinion reflected the views of the plurality of the Court.
117. Id. para. 46.
118. Id. para. 54.
119. Id. para. 25.
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terms of the maritime rights themselves rather than in equitable
verbiage has been felt in the two major subsequent cases of St.PierreMiquelon and Jan Mayen, where the majority opinions barely use the
"E" word beyond a decorative function. In St.Pierre & Miquelon, the
composite fundamental norm of equitable principles or criteria, relevant
circumstances and equitable results was mentioned, 20 only to be soon
forgotten, the ICJ making clear that "[g]eographical features are at the
heart of the delimitation process," 12 1 and are proceeding to specific
applications.
On the heels of St.Pierre-Miquelon came Jan Mayen, with a similar
dilemma of a tiny island claiming a vast segment of the ocean as its
shelf and fishery zone against a massive opposing mainland. The ICJ
adopted a modified median line. Did equity provide any guidelines?
We will look in vain in the majority opinion for any real equitable
discussion. Indeed, the single reference that qualifies is a quote from
Libya-Malta stating that only pertinent considerations count which,
coupled with a promise to consult the practice of states and the cases,
suggests that free-wheeling equity must be reigned in to avoid
arbitrariness and to strengthen predictability.' 22 The basic approach of
the ICJ was merely to add the equitable label to whatever factual
factors were chosen on their own merits. Judge Schwebel articulated
an even more jaundiced view of equity, and expressed concern that the
ICJ used the equitable labels at will to divide certain fishing resources
in a manner as supportable as any of its alternatives. The anti-equity
language in his separate opinion is quite potent:
[I]f what is equitable is as variable as the weather of the Hague, then
this innovation [equal access to certain areas] may be seen as, and may
be, as defensible and desirable as another 123 .. , the obscure measure
of adjustment of the median line between Libya and Malta appears to
have had the benefit of inspiration, if divine, then from Roman
gods124 ...
the authority to seek an equitable solution by the
application of a law whose principles remain largely undefined affords
the ICJ an exceptional measure of judicial discretion125 . .. the ICJ

120. St. Pierre & Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. 1145, para. 38.
121. Id. para. 24.

Judge Weil, in a dissenting opinion, criticized the Tribunal for

adopting a position amounting to "I know an equitable result when I see it" which is contrary to the principles and corrective equity of Libya-Malta, Anglo-French Arbitration and
North Sea. In his view, the Result her constituted an injustice committed in the name of
equity. Id. paras. 29-30. His apparent substitute principle of drawing a line far enough
to assure "a sufficient maritime territory" and not too close to "threaten sovereign interests" is, however, vulnerable to a similar charge.
122. Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, paras. 57-58.
123. Id. at 120. See also Judge Oda's dissent, id. paras. 1, 90-100.
124. Id. at 125.
125. Id. at 128.
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leavens its Judgment with a large infusion of equitable ferment ...and
so concocts a conclusion which does not lend itself to dissection or, for
that matter, dissent.126
On the other hand, in Judge Weeramantry's separate opinion in
Jan Mayen we are exposed to the lengthiest yet most judicial
elaboration of equitable doctrine. This constitutes a challenge that
must be addressed. 127 That opinion is mostly a learned treatise on
equity in general, as well as in international law and in maritime
delimitations, exploring in detail its historical and conceptual
dimensions.
The question that needs to be answered, however, is
whether this doctrinal discussion had anything to do with the issues of
the case. The approach of Judge Weeramantry was more or less the
following. First, he cited the multiple equitable labels used by the ICJ
in the past to embellish its particular choices. 128 But there was no
examination of whether the label affected the choice of what was
relevant and where to draw the line. 129 Second, he called equity the
creative force which animates the life of international law, citing the
concept of international mandates and trusts, good faith, pacta sunt
servanda, ius cogens, unjust enrichment, rebus sic standibus abuse of
rights, 30 prescription, reciprocity, equality in court,' 3 ' estoppel,
fairness, reasonableness, 1 32 use of one's property as not to harm others, 33 as well as the audi alteram partem rule, 34 and the notions that
equity looks to the intent rather than to the form, and that a person
must not act contrary to his own representation on the faith of which
others have acted. 35 However, do these lofty concepts give us any
guidance on how to address the main controversies on the drawing of
maritime boundaries? Third, he tried to distinguish maritime equity
from absolute equity and ex aequo et bono, but only at the level of
rhetoric. 136
Particularly disturbing is his proposition that relevant
circumstances means all conceivable factors unless a rule of law
excludes them, 137 rather than the other way around.
Fourth, he

126. Id.
127. Judge Ajibola also separately engaged in an abstract dithyrumb for equity. Id. at
280-314.
128. Id. paras. 60, 62-65, 68, 70, 75, 87, and 90-92.
129. Id. para. para. 5-10.
130. Id. paras. 16-17.
131. Id. para. 84.
132. Id. para. 110.
133. Id. para. 145.
134. Id. para. 25.
135. Id. para. 48.
136. Id. paras. 20, 52-64.
137. Id. para. 26. However we find a contrary statement in para. 150: "The decision
whether a matter has relevance or not would naturally be dependent also on any applicable rules of law, for, the equity the Court is here using is not Equity not equity contra le-
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repeated in many places that not only equitable principles but also
equitable procedures and results are important. Fine, but which ones
are relevant here, why, and how do they work? Fifth, he cautioned
against viewing equity in the Roman and Anglo-American tradition as
corrective of the insufficiencies and rigidities of the law, and viewed it
rather as a general principle. 138 But and if we detach it from this
tradition, not only do we diminish its international function but we also
empty it of content.
While we cannot fail to admire Judge
Weeramantry's erudition and concern, we must not forget the dangers
to justice posed by indeterminate, subjective concepts and processes.
These dangers are all the more real if they are combined with the
notion of instinctive distributive justice under various guises, 139 with
140
which Judge Weeramantry flirted despite ambiguous disclaimers.
The crystallization over time of the elements of the maritime zones
within their own frame of reference enables us to describe and to
implement the rights directly and with greater precision, which will
both encourage submissions to adjudication and facilitate the task of
the judges. The factors named by Judge Weeramantry, such as
proportionality to coast lengths, equidistance, security, population,
economic need, prior conduct of states etc., are best dealt with on their
own terms. The equitable icing adds little, if anything.
In conclusion, it took more than a quarter century of mostly wasted
effort to realize that there was not much equity out there, and that the
boundaries of the continental shelf should be delimited directly on the
basis of internal criteria through a logical and teleological interpretive
particularizing process. At most, equity provided an umbrella of

gum."
138. Id. paras. 43-51. But see id. paras. 133-135.
139. Examples :
[The] additional juristic basis for checking a result for its equity or
inequity comes from the "sense of injustice" which has an ancient
history in the philosophy of jurisprudence'(para. 41); '[as] principles
relating to an equitable sharing of resources become more urgently
required, this route for the entry of equity will perhaps assume
increasing importance in developing the law of the sea' (para. 85);
'[a]lthough justice by its very nature is incapable of comprehensive
formulation, injustice by its very nature is often a matter of instant
detection' (para. 105); equitable... sharing of resources... is playing
an increasingly important international role, (paras. 118-120); the
relevant considerations' cannot be limited to the purely geographic' or
'geophysical' (paras. 185, 210) and population or economic factors may
be taken into account even if changeable (paras. 150, 211-219).
140. See, e.g. id. para. 60 (equity not ex aequo et bono); id. para. 62 (we should not
disregard the letter for the spirit of the law); para. 121 ("equity in the sense of distributive
justice and redistribution of wealth in not involved in [this] case").
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justification and a time lag for the courts to search for a consensus on
the components of the maritime zones and on the factors which
teleologically and practically were more consistent with the underlying
maritime rights. This process explored the implications of geographical
appurtenance without filtering them through some magical equitable
potion. UNCLOS restored the primacy of positive international law,
and preserved equity only in the exceptional form of a test of the
ultimate solution, thus placing it in the Aristotelian teleological mold.
IV. THE CURRENT SCENE IN DELIMITATIONS - BACK TO THE
FUTURE OF EQUIDISTANCE WITH OR AGAINST
PROPORTIONALITY
Starting with a brief resume of the current status of what was
rejected and what has been preserved, I will focus mainly on the
specifics of how and where to adjust, the old monster equidistance, the
white knight of equity, to the requirements of proportionality which
have not yet been explored sufficiently in the literature. I will then
consider how all of this affects the position of islands, and especially
how it plays itself out in the Aegean.
A. Clearing Up the Debris:The Rejections
1. No to Factors Unrelated to Coastal Geography
In the spirit of equity within the law, the cases progressively
limited the delimitation factors first to geography and then only to
coastal geography. As aptly put by a leading commentator:
The black letter of the law, however, has not been swallowed up in the
black hole of equity. The jurisprudence has winnowed and shed light
upon the circumstances relevant to delimitation. The legal basis of
title remains central to the idea of an equitable result. Geography
retains - or rather, has regained - its primacy over all other factors.
And natural boundary concepts have been laid to rest, probably for all
141
time.
A state without a coast has neither continental shelf nor exclusive
economic zone. A coastal state standing alone and without a neighbor
within 200 miles is entitled to the entire shelf and zone. All coasts
count the same: there are no primary or secondary ones. States with
equal coastal geography receive equal shares.
141. Leonard Legault & Blair Hankey, Method, Oppositeness and Adjacency, and Proportionality in Maritime Boundary Delimitation, in INTERNATIONAL MARITIME
BOUNDARIES, supra note 4, at 203, 206 [hereinafter Legault & Hankey].
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This conception led to the unequivocal rejection of the following
non-geographical considerations:
(a) Demographic, social or general economic factors, which, in any
142
event, are ephemeral and changeable.

142. There was no reference to these factors in North Sea or the Anglo-French Arbitration. In Tunisia-Libya, variable economic factors such as poverty and need were rejected. Tunisia-Libya, 1982 I.C.J. 18, paras. 106-107. In Judge Oda's view, such issues as
well as the size of the population involve "global resource policies, or basic problems of
world politics which not only could not have been solved by the judicial organ of the world
community, but stray well beyond equity as a norm of law into the realm of social organization". Id. para. 157 (dissenting opinion). With the "catastrophic consequences" proviso
(para. 237), Gulf of Maine also supports the proposition that economic, social etc. considerations are irrelevant. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.J.J. 246, paras. 59, 157, 196, 234-238. In
Libya-Malta, relevant circumstances did not include economic factors such as the absence
of energy resources, developing requirements and fishing activity. Libya-Malta, 1985
I.C.J. 13, para. 50. To the same effect see GuinealGuinea-Bissau, 24 I.L.M. 267, paras.
122-123. In St. Pierre & Miquelon, the separate agreements on fisheries among the parties had taken care of the issue of access to them eliminating the issue of "catastrophic
consequences" (Pierre & Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. 1145, paras. 85-87) and the economic dependence and needs were not otherwise to be taken into account. Id. para. 83. Cf. Judge
Weil (dissenting opinion): "It goes without saying that a maritime delimitation line cannot
be dictated by the concern to apportion resources .... In short, the boundary is where it is
and the resources are where they are." Id. para. 34. Particular socio-economic and cultural factors and the size of the populations were excluded from the relevant considerations in Jan Mayen. Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, para. 79-80.
On the other hand, Judge Weeramantry considered as "juristically untenable and not in
conformity with the flexibility of equity ... the general proposition that population of
economy are irrelevant because ...they may change with time". Id. para. 211 (separate
opinion). See also id. paras. 212-219. For a similar view, see id. para. 14 (Judge Fischer
dissenting).
For a comprehensive and accurate review of these issues, see Derek W. Bowett, The Economic Factor in Maritime Delimitation Cases, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT AGO, supra note 5, at 45. Kwiatkowska's doubts on this reflect her strong doctrinal preference for
resorting to economic and social considerations de lege ferenda. She delphically states:
[The inclusion of economic consideration into circumstances relevant
to maritime delimitation (to an extent broader than the courts so far
admit)] ...is advocated in this chapter on the basis of the assumption
that the courts' present restrictive approach may be subject to evolution toward the latter, more liberal, approach. Would that assumption
prove incorrect, there still seems to exist an additional, unstated alternative. In particular, the possibility could not with certainty be excluded that, in spite of a formal rejection of the relevance of economic
factors, the courts do and will continue to take such factors into account in the delimitation process. Such assumption would seem to be
supported by the difference between the courts' role in making the law
and the court's role in applying the law.
Kwiatkowska, supra note 5, at 106-107.
On the other hand, considerations of distributive justice rather than the delineation of the
seaward projection of coasts are reflected in the UNCLOS regime of sharing certain resources within the exclusive economic zone and on the ocean floor. The Convention imposes significant "equitable access" obligations on coastal states for the benefit of certain
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(b) Historical practice and usage,1 43 with the exception of the
"catastrophic-repercussions-historical-dependence" proviso for fish1 44

ing.

The emphasis on coastal geography further led to the equally clear
rejection of the following non-coastal considerations:
145
(c) The size, shape or depth of the land territory behind the coast.

other states with respect to certain surplus living resources within their exclusive economic zone. See FRANCISCO ORREGO VICUNA, THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE 49-69
(1989), for a detailed study of this access right.
While such "sharing" obviously opens the door to considerable discretion, the use of the
equitable label does not constitute an invitation for the decision makers to develop their
own intuitions. The Convention takes a major step toward specificity by identifying the
key economic and geographical criteria of distribution.
Similarly and in a related field, the Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of Watercourses (U.N. Doc. A/42/10 (1987)) seeks to regulate the distribution of a scarce resource,
directing that international watercourse systems in state territories shall be used in an
equitable and reasonable manner. The relevant criteria are then identified with specificity: geographic, hydrographic, climactic factors, social and economic needs, existing and
potential uses, conservation, protection, development and economy, the availability of alternatives, etc. For a description of the scheme of the Convention, see Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Law of International Water Courses: Some Recent Developments and Unanswered Questions, 17 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 505 (1989).
It is debatable whether the equitable label used in these contexts in helpful. This sharing
reflects adjustments in the exercise within a defined area of an indivisible joint, although
not identical, right, while maritime delimitations draw the lines that separate divisible
rights. While it might be argued that the equitable characterization is more apt where
the legislative motivation is distributive of resources rather than merely definitional of
geographic appurtenance, the reference to predetermined and identified, albeit broad, criteria suggests that we are again dealing with particularizing interpretations consistent
with the logic and purpose of the related regimes and that a more direct approach is indicated.
143. Gulf of Maine,1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 237. Cf. Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, paras.
73-78. For the comparable views of Oda, J., see para. 98 of his separate opinion.
144. There was no reference to these factors either in North Sea, or in the AngloFrench Arbitration. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3; Anglo-French Arbitration, 16 I.L.M. 54. In
Tunisia-Libya, the Court did examine historical factors but only in the context of past
conduct of the parties on a theory of estoppel and gave some incidental weight to them.
Tunisia-Libya, 1982 I.C.J. 18, paras. 81-102, 105, 116-21. In Gulf of Maine, the Chamber
considered the historical development of the land boundary between the two countries as
irrelevant. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 42. In Guinea/Guinea-Bissau, the Tribunal made partial use of a treaty-based "southern limit" as the line in support of the
conduct of the parties and its coincidence with the land boundary. Guinea/Guinea-Bissau,
24 I.L.M. 267, paras. 105-06. In Jan Mayen, the Court concluded that the conduct of the
parties in other delimitations between them had not established a binding precedent. Jan
Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, paras. 82-86.
It should be pointed out that we are discussing here only continental shelf and exclusive
zone delimitations. The role of historic rights, however limited, in territorial and archipelagic waters is another matter.
145. There was no reference to these factors in North Sea or the Anglo-French
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(d) Whether the coastal land territory is entirely surrounded by
water (island), or whether it belongs to a landmass (mainland). This
last topic will be explored in-depth in a subsequent section.
2. No to Physical Natural Prolongation
The second seminal determination was to abandon the idea of the
physical natural prolongation for the continental shelf and, by
extension, the exclusive economic zone. Thus, the characteristics of the
ocean floor, such as geomorphology and geology, nature of the sea-bed
and the subsoil, direction and angle of the slope, and the character of
the water column, such as depth and content, have been treated as
irrelevant. As a consequence, where distance counted, it was measured
not on the seabed, but on the surface of the water. In the Anglo-French
Arbitration, the ICJ downgraded the natural prolongation idea and put
46
the emphasis on geography rather than on geology or geomorphology.1
In Tunisia-Libya, the parties, reading North Sea as basically a natural
prolongation case, equated equity with prolongation which, however,
they interpreted differently.1 47 The ICJ disagreed with this approach,
sounding the death-knell for natural prolongation by treating it not as a
physical fact but as a legal concept, as a label for all the other relevant
considerations.' 48 This continued in Libya-Malta, 149 and it is safe to
assume that natural prolongation belongs to the past. A noted publicist
has characterized natural prolongation as an "unfortunate device" and
a "pure figment of the ICJ's imagination.""150 The joint delimitation of
continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, if not the absorption of
the former by the latter in subsequent cases, and the measurement of
the lines uniformly on the surface of the water have sealed the fate of
natural prolongation.

Arbitration. In Guinea/Guinea-Bissau, the Tribunal rejected any test of proportionality to
the respective landmasses. Id. at 118-120. In Libya-Malta, relevant geography did not
include the size of the landmass behind the coast. Id. para. 49.
146. Anglo-French Arbitration, 16 I.L.M. 54, paras. 107, 194.
147. Tunisia-Libya, 1982 I.C.J. 18, para. 39. Judge de Arechaga criticized this approach, taking the position that "equitable principles have pride of place and apply from
the start to the whole area subject to delimitation and not just to marginal or overlapping
segments of that area." Id. paras. 13-17 (de Arechaga, J., separate opinion).
148. Anglo-French Arbitration, 16 I.L.M. 54, paras. 40-61, 66-68. See also the separate opinion of Judge de Arechaga, where the concept of the continental shelf is fully disassociated from any geological or geomorphological facts. Id. paras. 37-64 (de Arechaga,
J., separate opinion).
149. Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J. 13, paras. 30-36.
150. Robert Jennings, The Principles Governing Maritime Boundaries, 397, 406 in
FESTSCHRIFT FUER KARL DOEHRING (1989).
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B. The Preservationsand Refinements
1. The Rehabilitation of Equidistance
Distance from the coast on the surface of the water has re-emerged
as the dominant consideration, with equidistance as the primary
implementing equality rule. 151 A full review of all the cases will
become quite repetitive, so only some highlights will be pointed out in
the notes. 15 2 I n the text, it suffices to refer to the boost that
equidistance received in the last case, Jan Mayen. The ICJ determined
that the median line occupies an important place in the practice of
states. In addition, the ICJ determined that, in opposite coast
situations, it "produces, in most geographical circumstances, an
equitable result." It began the delimitation with a provisional single
median line as "entirely appropriate."'15 3 It also warned against
resorting to an open-ended list of special or relevant circumstances to
undermine consistency and predictability, 15 4 and examined the fishery
155
zone in the same vein.
156
Confirmed by its overwhelming prevalence in state practice,
equidistance reflects acceptance of the inherently equal and equitable
nature of the median line, treated in fact and often in law as the
appropriate line, especially the starting line, subject to some
adjustment for proportionality of shares to coast lengths. While it is a
natural for opposite coasts, it will not produce distorting effects in
adjacencies either if the respective coastlines are streamlined in terms
of relevance, direction, configuration and projection.

It is important to stress at this point that the verbal distinctions
between high-level, primary (sole, obligatory, final) equidistance, and

151. See George P. Politakis, The 1993 Jan Mayen Judgment: The end of Illusions?, 41
NETH. INT'L L. REV. 1 [hereinafter Politakis]; KWIAKOVSKA, FORTY YEARS, supra note 5, at
95; Jennings, supra note 150, at 408; Kenneth Highet, Whatever Became of Natural Prolongation, in RIGHTS TO OCEANIC RESOURCES 87-100 (Dallmeyer & De Vorsey eds., 1989);

Shigeru Oda, The Delimitationof a Single Maritime Boundary-The Contribution of Equidistance to Geographical Equity in the InterrelatedDomains of the Continental Shelf and
the Exclusive Economic Zone, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT AGO 349-362 (1989).

152. See Politakis, supra note 151, at 95.
153. Jan Mayen, supra note 2, paras. 49-53, 56, 64-65 (citing North Sea, supra note 3,
paras. 57-58 and Libya-Malta, supra note 2, para. 62); see e.g., Politakis, supra note 151,
at 16-17.
154. Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, paras. 57-58.
155. Id. paras. 47, 53, 71, 90. Oda, J., explained in detail his opposition to treating
the fishing zone under the standards applicable to the exclusive zone. Id. paras. 6-23
(Oda, J., dissenting opinion).
156. See e.g., Charney, Progress,supra note 64, at 245; Legault & Hankey, supra note
141, at 221.
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lowly, secondary equidistance (provisional, possible) have now lost most
of their significance since the elimination of most of its competitors
makes its dislocation virtually impossible. Furthermore, the theoretical
discussions about its classification as a norm, a principle, a method, a
consideration, a factor or even a technique are largely inconsequential.
Under whatever name and form, when it stands alone its message is
quite clear: other things being equal, the equality of the shares derives
from the equality of the distances. The only significant reasons for
deviation revolve around the disproportionality issue to which we will
now turn.
2. The Intermediation of Proportionality to Avert Gross Disparities
Between Zones and Lengths of Coastlines
In international law, the concept of proportionality as an aspect
of equality has played a very limited role. Basically, it has been used
only to implement the remedial notion that action taken to effectuate a
right or power must not be excessive.
Typical examples involve
proportionality in the use of force and in the restriction of human
57
rights.1
Its emergence as the principal instrument to contain the potential
inequitable results of equidistance in making the final cuts of the pie of
the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone, reflects not so
much the application of principle as the recognition that a substantive
factor other than distance from a coast on the water, namely the length
of such coast, should also be taken into consideration. In other words, it
is not the commitment to proportionality but the recognition of the
relevance of the coastal length that explains this development.
The concern about gross disproportionality of shelves to coastlines
was there from the very beginning. In North Sea, its role was pivotal in
underwriting the concavity argument. 158
A reasonable degree of
proportionality between shelves and lengths is a reasonable result
dictated by equitable principles. 15 9 Most of the judges who dissented or
who wrote separate opinions were equally, if not more, concerned about
60
this problem of disproportion.1
157. See HIGGINS, supra note 17, at 230-236.
158. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, paras. 87, 91, 98. The exact language of the majority
opinion at paragraph 91 deserves to be quoted: "What is unacceptable in this instance is
that a State should enjoy continental shelf rights different from those of its neighbors
merely [because of the convex or concave form of the coastline] although those coastlines
are comparable in length."
159. Id. paras.89, 90, and 98. See Legault & Hankey, supra note 141, at 217.
160. 1. Bustamante Y Rivero:
[Tihe conclusion is inescapable that the State which has a longer
coastline will have a more extensive shelf. The Judgment ... men-
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The need to avoid unreasonable disprortionality was instrumental
in configuring the outcomes reached in the cases after North Sea. In
the Anglo-French Arbitration, the ICJ stressed that "proportionality .... is clearly inherent in the notion of a delimitation in accordance
with equitable principles."'161 While proportionality may not be relevant
in all contexts, 162 and is not an independent source of rights, 163 the disproportionate effects of a considerable projection of an attenuated por64
tion of the coast must be abated.
Both parties in Tunisia-Libya referred to a "reasonable degree of
proportionality.. .between... shelf.. .and length of.. .coast."'16 5
The
ICJ added that it is "indeed required by the fundamental principle of
ensuing an equitable delimitation between the states concerned,"'166 and
gave it certain weight in assessing the equitableness of the lines drawn
on the basis of other criteria. Proportionality was also recognized in
some of the other opinions. Concurring Judge de Arechaga accepted it
in the form of a "test to be applied ex post facto... not a relevant circumstance or independent factor in itself."167 For Judge Oda, equidistance was equitable because it satisfied the requirement of proportionality. 168 On the other hand, Judge Gros took the position that the ICJ
went too far because proportionality is only the verifying factor, and not

tions this element as one of the factors to be taken into consideration
for the delimitation of a shelf; the Court nevertheless did not confer
upon it the character of an obligatory principle.
North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 59.
2. Padilla Nervo: "The distorting effect caused by the application of the lateral equidistance line, when it cannot be accounted for by the length of the coastline, justifies the application of the special circumstances principle." Id. para. 92.
3. Ammoun: "The Federal Republic is justified in rejecting... a share which.., would
be out of all proportion to the respective lengths of coastal frontage of the parties." Id.
para. 43.
4. Morelli:
In my opinion, the gravely inequitable nature of the result to which
the application of the criterion of equidistance in the present case
leads must be recognized, this inequitable character consisting in the
remarkable disproportion between the area of the continental shelves
pertaining to each of the three States on the one hand and the length
of their respective coastlines on the other ....
Id. para. 15.
161. Anglo-French Arbitration, 16 I.L.M. 54, paras. 98-99; see id. paras. 99, 250.
162. Id. para. 99.
163. Id. paras. 101, 250.
164. Id. para. 249.
165. Tunisia-Libya, 1982 I.C.J. 18, para. 37.
166. Id. para. 103.
167. Id. para. 117.
168. Id. para. 176.
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even a method. 169
In Gulf of Maine, the Chamber employed as a principal method an
equal-division geographical approach reflecting the same consideration
as equidistance,' 70 but also made corrections in all sectors based on the
auxiliary criterion of proportionality to the length of the respective
coastlines.' 7' In the first segment, the Chamber sought to avoid the
disproportionally distorting effect of certain rocks and low-tide eleva-

tions under equidistance, as well impractical zig-zaggings. 172 In the
central area, it took a look at the Gulf, and concluded that it was "obvi-

ous that the length of the coasts belonging to the United States .. is
considerably greater than that of the coasts belonging to Canada,"'173
considered this difference notable, and gave it some weight as a special
circumstance. 174 Not to recognize this circumstance of undeniable importance would be a denial of the obvious.' 75 The Chamber then totally
corrected the median line only in this short segment to reflect exactly
the proportionality ratio in the entire area. The shift also had some indirect effect on the third segment,' 76 with significant impact on the division of Georges Bank, the apple of discord.
Nevertheless, the Chamber did not justify this last consequences as
a proportionality adjustment, but only as a reflection of the general geography. 77 The division of the overlapping areas in the triple-linedelimitation case of Guinea/Guinea-Bissau was complicated both by

treaties, 178 and by the determination of the Tribunal to place it within
the context of past and future delimitations with the other neighboring
states.' 79 Still, the Tribunal determined that the coasts of the parties
were about the same length, and considered whether the line, constructed on other grounds, required adjustment for reason of proportionality to the length of the coastlines. The answer was in the negative
since the division ended up equal. 8 0

A major portion of the opinion in Libya-Malta is devoted to an
elaborate discussion of the factor of proportionality, which arises from
the equitable principle that nature must be respected.18l First, the ICJ
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. para. 17.
Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, paras. 178, 188, 201, 210, 212.
Id. para. 185.
Id. paras. 202, 209, 213.
Id. para. 184.
Id.
Id. para. 218.
Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, paras.223-26.
Id. para. 226.
Guinea/Guinea-Bissau, 24 I.L.M. 267, para. 106.
Id. paras. 108-09.
Id. para. 120.
Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J. 13, paras. 55-57.
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rejected Libya's far-reaching and novel proposition that proportionality
be used as independent criterion, thus leaving it in an auxiliary
status.18 2 However, the ICJ suggested that where disproportion is very
great, as here, proportionality may be employed not only at the end to
test the result obtained on other grounds, but also in the initial stage of
seeking the overall methodology. 8 3 It is, however, significant that a
good number of judges questioned the relevance of proportionality
altogether, especially in this context. 8 4 In St.Pierre & Miquelon, the
ICJ made positive reference to proportionality, 185 but rejected the
notion that the ratio of coastal lengths should itself be determinative of
the respective areas, 186 and sought its own solution in the form of
concrete lines, apparently taking into account proportionality, but
without quantified particularization. 8 7 0 n the other hand, Judge
Weil, in his dissenting opinion, attacked proportionality as providing a
sham equity in situtations where it might operate blindly and
mechanistically on largely arbitrary data. At most, only a great
disparity counts and only as one relevant circumstance and a posteriori. 88
An important contribution of this case to the doctrine of
proportionality is that it did not accept the Canadian contention that
"particular segments of a coast may have an increased or diminished
projection, depending on their length. The extent of the seaward
projection will depend, in every case, on the geographical
circumstances .... " 189 In other words, a mile of coast is a mile of coast,
whether it is part of a long or a short coast, and whatever the ratio of
the competing coasts.
Finally, Jan Mayen, as the last word from the ICJ on the subject,
deserves our careful attention:

182. Id. para. 58.
183. Id. paras. 66-67. See Judges Ruda, Bedjaoui and de Arechaga, who also stressed
the great importance of proportionality. Id. paras. 20-34.
184. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Oda both disputed the use of proportionality in
the initial stage and questioned its applicability in a situation of opposite coasts where no
major distorting circumstances, for example, concavity were involved. In addition, he attacked the failure of the Court to particularize and explain the application. Id. paras. 1328 (Oda, J., dissenting opinion). In his dissenting opinion, Judge Valticos cautioned that
the proportionality factor should not be used in opposite situations not involving any abnormalities. He also wondered whether it was possible to quantify it without relying on
subjective judgments. Id. paras.19-22 (Valticos, J., dissenting opinion). Judges Mosler
and Schwebel were even more unequivocally against proportionality here, arguing that
the difference in the length of the coasts was already reflected in the way they projected
into this large area. Id. at pp. 112, 173-75 (Mosler & Schwebel, J's., dissenting opinions).
185. St. Pierre & Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. 1145, para. 45.
186. Id. para. 63 (citing Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J. 13, paras. 58, 66).
187. Id. paras. 60-65.
188. Id. paras. 20-23 (Weil, J., dissenting opinion).
189. Id. para. 45.
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[T]he law does not require a delimitation based upon an endeavor to
share out an area of overlap on the basis of comparative figures for the
length of the coastal fronts and the areas generated by them. 190
The ICJ also rejected the notion that proportionality requires a
direct and mathematical application of ratios. 191 But when the shares
are "so disproportionate... it has been found necessary to take this
192
circumstance into account in order to ensure an equitable solution."'
Indeed, the first and main Jan Mayen rule was that equidistance and
proportionality appeared only as a moderating factor to test the results
reached under other geographical methods. In view of the nine-to-one
ratio of lengths, the median line was moved somewhat toward Jan
Mayen. 193
Some judges who were committed to the primacy of
equidistance considered proportionality as too indeterminate and
9
subjective to be of much help. 4
The ascendancy of proportionality as a corrective equitable factor of
equidistance
has been
noticed and generally
applauded by
commentators,' 95 but not without some dissent, mostly resulting from
its indeterminacy.' 96
The practical significance of the distinction
between proportionality operating at the initial stage of delimitation,
and proportionality being used only as a final test of a result reached
under other methods is not as important as it sounds. This is so
because only gross disproportion counts, and the adjustment will be
similar regardless of stage.
3. How About the Location
Encroachment and No-Cut-Offs?

of

Natural

Resources,

Non-

Before
consecrating
the
marriage
of
equidistance
with
proportionality as monogamous and pursuing its practical applications,
we should consider whether any other factors may still play some
equitable role.

190. Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, para. 64. The primacy of equidistance both as leading
to equitable results and as reflecting the practice of states is emphasized in paras. 64-65.
Id.
191. Id. para. 69.
192. Id. para. 65.
193. Id. paras. 65-69. Some writers viewed the minor movement as downgrading 'to
the vanishing point' the 'tyranny of coastal ratios.' See, e.g., Politakis, supra note 153, at

1.
194.
195.
note 6,
196.

See id. at pp. 3-11 (Schwebel, J., separate opinion).
See e.g. Legault & Hankey, supra note 141, at 217-221; Charney, Progress,supra
at 241-243. See also O'CONNELL, supra note 5, at 724.
See HIGGINS, supra note 17, at 230 and 236
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(a) Natural Resources
The entire logic and system of the maritime zones, based on
territorial appurtenance and coastal geography and excluding
distributive justice and other economic factors, suggest that the
resources fall where they may. What about the situation, however,
where the geographic boundary line is to be adjusted in response to a
non-precise localizing criterion, such as proportionality to the length of
the coastlines? Since the decisionmaker enjoys a degree of flexibility in
deciding where to cut, 197 may the location of resources be given some
weight? In what way?
As explained previously, the technical preservation of the unity of
resources proposed in North Sea through joint exploration or other
means of avoiding waste makes good sense where they straddle the
natural boundary. With the now extinct factor of natural prolongation
which undergirded it,198 at most this factor may still have some
analogical applicability only in situations where the ICJ, under the
current theories of identifying an overlap, (i.e. proportionality or
avoidance of catastrophic repercussions), has some flexibility to adjust
the line drawn within the fringe area. In the post-North Sea cases,
there were some references to this factor. But the ICJ only explicitly
took this factor into account in the last case, Jan Mayen,199 where it
relied on proportionality to divide a certain area on Jan Mayen's side of
the equidistance line. Within that area, the ICJ divided Zones 2 and 3
two-to-one. But the ICJ split the comparatively smaller Zone 1, which
contained most of high stakes of the dispute, the capelin, on the basis of
a median line to provide Greenland equitable access to that resource. 200
Some judges severely criticized this for its obscurity and apparent
arbitrariness. Judge Oda wondered whether we compare the interests
of all Danish versus all Norwegian fishermen.
Why limit this

197. See Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, para. 90.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 62 et seq.
199. See Malcom Evans, Less Than an Ocean Apart: The St. Pierreand Miquelon and
Jan Mayen Islands and the Delimitationof Maritime Zones, INT'L & COMP. L.J. 678, 692693, [hereinafter Evans]. In Tunisia-Libya, the Court left open the possibility that the
location of existing oil wells may be an element to be taken into account to achieve an equitable result. Id. para. 107. This, however, can be explained in terms of the prior action
and conduct of the parties. In Gulf of Maine, the case where the fishing grounds of Georges Bank were clearly at the heart of the dispute, the Court excluded such location as a
relevant factor of delimitation. Id. para. 232. See also para. 237. Cf. Gros, J. dissenting
opinion, para. 48. The way that it adjusted the line for proportionality, especially its
outer-zone projection, however, may be interpreted as sensitive to its impact on resources.
In Libya-Malta, we find a vague dictum to the effect that natural resources in the shelf
might constitute a relevant circumstance to be reasonably considered. Id. para. 50, citing
North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 101 (D2).
200. Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, paras. 91-92.
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2
consideration only to a small part of the area? Why equal division? 01
Judge Schwebel was stunned by this apparent intrusion of distributive
justice, and was quite sarcastic in his opposition:

While the ICJ may be commended for the simplicity of its conclusion, a
is less
principled consistency with its earlier case-law
conspicuous .... [I]n this, the most critical holding of the Judgment on
the real assets at stake, the ICJ jettisons what its case-law, and the
accepted customary law of the question, have provided [cites and
quotes from past cases].

202

It is in this context that Judge Schwebel made reference to the
equitable being as predictable as the weather in the Hague! Judge
Fischer was also critical of the introduction of this new type of median
line, arguing in the other direction that economic considerations
supported an even larger share for Greenland. 20 3 A limited reading of
this action in Jan Mayen would consider it as a variant of the
catastrophic repercussions theme of radical inequity relating to
fisheries as articulated first in Gulf of Maine.20 4 A more plausible and
geographical interpretation would focus on the fact that these resources
were on the fringes of the equidistance-cum-proportionality line, and
were divided on the theory that, in that narrow range, when in doubt,
205
cut in half.
All of this boils down to the conclusion that in principle the location
of natural resources in the shelf or economic zone is irrelevant to their
delimitation, subject to the catastrophic repercussions proviso. When,
however, resources happen to be located on or about the equidistancecum-proportionality line, there is some judicial discretion to adjust the
line to reflect the internal considerations of delimitation overall. This,
of course, excludes either equal shares, as such, or shares out of a hat.
In case of doubt, however, an equal split would not be inappropriate.

201. Id. paras. 92-95.
202. Id. at 118. (Schwebel, J, separate opinion).
203. Id. paras. 15, 21 (Fischer, J., dissenting opinion)
204. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 75. See e.g., Jan Mayen, supra note 2;
KWIATKOVSKA, Jennings, supra note 45, at 105-06. Professor Charney criticized the
Court for the reference to population which may be misunderstood to revive the socioeconomic factors. Jonathan I. Charney, Panel, The Law of the Sea: Recent Delimitation
Cases, AM. SOC. INT'L L. PROC. 1, 13, 17 (1993). See also Charney, Progress,supra note 4,
at 237-39. Such factors had been specifically repudiated by the Court. Gulf of Maine, supra note 2, paras. 79-80
205. See e.g., John P. Kozyris, Remarks, The Law of the Sea: Recent Delimitation
Cases, in AM. SOC. INT'L L. PROC. 15 (1993).
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(b) Non-Encroachment and No-Cut-Offs (Security?)
Our first observation must point out the question-begging, if not
tautological, nature of both these considerations, casually mentioned in
some of the cases. Indeed, non-encroachment appears merely to state a
legal conclusion, that one should not cross into areas that already
belong to another. It does not address the question of what belongs to
whom. It was used for the first time in North Sea in exactly that sense:
thou shall not intrude into another's prolongation, with nature
providing the boundary. The demise of natural prolongation has taken
the wind out of the sails of this derivative idea of non-encroachment. It
has persisted, however, in the form of the related but not identical
notion of no-cut-off. Unlike non-encroachment, which is aimed at
intrusion into one's own, the no-cut-off idea reflects a connection
concept: it is intended to prevent interference with access. It stands to
reason that such a concept argues primarily for the unity of allocated
shares, 20 6 and, where proportionality adjustments are being made, the
technique e.g. of 'equiratio', 20 7 gives it maximum effect. The references
to no-cut-off suggest also two other possible but problematical uses.
First, we do find language in some cases to the effect that the
boundary should not be drawn too close to the shores of a state. 208 But
this begs the question since, by definition, assuming that equidistance
or a similar geometrical method has been used, the same line is equally
close to the shores of the other state. Indeed, St.Pierre & Miquelon
recognized that a cut-off is the typical and unavoidable consequence of
drawing lines between competing seaward projections. 209 If only certain
projections, for example frontal or primary projectors versus radial or
secondary projectors, are preferred as a matter of law will this cut-off
notion assume a meaning of its own. But these distinctions have been
decisively rejected. 210 A related but much narrower idea would give

206. See Bernard H. Oxman, Political,Strategic and Historical Consideration,in IMB
3, 22-30 (1993), for the state practice of occasional mutually-beneficial readjustment of the
boundaries to that effect.
207. See infra notes 269-272 and accompanying text.
208. See Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 196; Guinea/Guinea-Bissau, 24 I.L.M.
267, para. 92. In Tunisia-Libya, Judge de Arechaga referred to the "equitable principle of
nonencroachment ... in front of or close to the coasts of a state, based on distance from
the coast." Tunisia-Libya, 1982 I.C.J. 18, paras. 69, 72, 75. See generally Elisabeth Zoller,
Recerche sur les methodes de delimitation du plateau continental: A propos de l'affaire
Tunisie-Libye, 86 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 645, 668-670 (1982)

(criticizing Tunisia-Libya on the grounds of ambiguity and subjectivity). See also Mark B.
Feldman, The Tunisia-Libya ContinentalShelf Case: GeographicJustice or JudicialCompromise?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 219, 229 (1983) [hereinafter Feldman]
209. St. Pierre & Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. at 1169, para. 67.
210. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, paras. 36, 108; St. Pierre & Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. at
1166-67, paras. 57-59; Cf. at 1171, para. 73.
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priority, in proportionality adjustments, to a port over a rocky
Perhaps this no-cut-off notion is not merely a
promontory. 211
geographical construct, and a quite problematic one at that, but is
connected to considerations of national security. This is suggested in
Libya-Malta,212 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau,13 and Jan Mayen, 214 where the
emphasis was given to lines being drawn far enough off the coasts of the
parties. However, here again it is quite likely that the security needs of
one state are reciprocated by those of the other so that the end result is
again the median line. Furthermore, the extension of the territorial sea
up to twelve miles and the perfection of the modern means of detection
as well as of warfare make the security argument rather obsolete.
Second, no-cut-off may be deemed to refer to access to the high seas
from the zones of each of the competing states. 21 5 The problem with
this possible interpretation is not only that it may be inconsistent with
both equidistance and proportionality, but depending on geography that
makes little sense in terms of the nature of the maritime rights at issue.
Indeed, neither the continental shelf nor the exclusive economic zone
rights allow the state to interfere with navigation and passage of any
kind, so that access to other areas is assured no matter where these
delimitation lines are drawn.
(c) Conclusion
While there have been some incidental references in cases and in
literature to the location of natural resources, to non-encroachment and
to no-cut-offs, these factors have not been given much weight. Indeed
It is only where an
they have never operated by themselves.
that they may
is
to
be
made
for
other
reasons
adjustment of the line
derivatively play a tangential role. At most, within the realm of making

211. See, e.g., Anglo-French Arbitration, 16 I.L.M. 54, para. 244; Tunisia-Libya, 1982
I.C.J. 18, para. 75 (de Arechaga, J., separate opinion). See also St. Pierre & Miquelon, 31
I.L.M. 1145, para. 29 (Weil, J., dissenting opinion). In Libya-Malta, Judges Ruda, Bedjaoui and de Arechaga, expressed the view that in situations affected by the coastal projections of third states, the projection of the two delimiting states should not be radial, in
the shape of a trapezium, but frontal, in order to avoid cut-offs. Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J.
13, paras. 2, 4-15. (Ruda, J., Bedjaoui J., and de Arechaga, J., separate opinions). This
limited practical suggestion does not detract from the force of the basic principle of equal
treatment of all coasts and projections.
212. Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J. 13, para. 51.
213. Guinea/Guinea-Bissau, 24 I.L.M. 267, para. 124.
214. Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, para. 81.
215. Indeed, the objective of preventing cut-offs supports the position that, even where
the size of the zones of each party is quite different, each zone should touch the median
line. For example, in North Sea, Germany wanted its slice extended all the way to the
point where it met the median line with the opposite states of England and Norway.
North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 15. In the final negotiation, this claim was honored.
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proportionality adjustments, a court may exercise some remedial
discretion to adjust the line drawn in a manner that preserves and
allocates straddling resources according to the internal shelf-zone
criteria; and that prefers the geographical unity of shares and frontal
projections and links with the median line or with the open seas or with
significant localities, which should satisfy any external legitimate
security considerations.
C. Synthesizing Equidistancewith Coast-Length Proportionality
Once equidistance is placed on the surgical table to make cuts are
to harmonize it equitably with coastal lengths and to take in any
tangential considerations, the considerations of how much and where to
slice require both quantification and some organizing principles. 216 A
major problem in synthesizing the two methods is that either by itself
can, by and large, produce a total delimitation, so that some type of
balancing and prioritizing between them becomes necessary. Another
problem relates to the different quality of these two methods.
Equidistance as a geometric method is rather concrete. The discretion
in selecting basepoints and drawing baselines is manageable. On the
other hand, the operation of proportionality is less reducible to sizes
and lines. In St.Pierre & Miquelon, Judge Weil spoke eloquently of "the
uncertainties and dangers of the proportionality test in its quantified
form." Is the length of the coasts to be measured following the slightest
sinuosities and the deepest indentations, or is it to be measured
according to more or less arbitrary general directions? What are the
contours of the relevant area? These operations have "this in common
with love or Spanish inns: each finds in them what he brings to
them.' 217 The courts have been meandering through various techniques, raising concerns that the lines are being drawn
impressionistically, if not randomly. For example, in the relatively
straightforward opposite-coasts Libya-Malta case, which ended up in a
moderate adjustment of the median line, the majority appeared to be
jumping to its conclusions, no fewer than nine judges filed separate or
dissenting opinions or declarations. In another simple geographical
situation, Jan Mayen, ten of the fifteen judges on the ICJ filed separate
or dissenting opinions or declarations!

216. See Legault & Hankey, supra note 141, at 206.
217. St. Pierre & Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. at 1206, para. 24 (Weil, J., dissenting opinion).
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1. Determining Relative Importance and Weights
(a) Priority of Equidistance
The first thing that stands out is that reasonable proportionality to
coast length is not equal in rank to equidistance. No case used it as the
sole, the initial or even the provisional method. In no case was the
outcome due primarily to it. It appears in no treaty or comparable text.
Its principal function has been to test the result obtained through some
other method or at most to qualify the application of such other method.
Furthermore, the negative emphasis on disproportion, rather than on
proportionality, as such, and the requirement of some magnitude, if not
grossness, together with the qualification of reasonableness, suggest
that this factor is of the safety-valve type, intended to moderate only
21 8
serious offenses to the equality principle.
(b) Opposite v. Adjacent Coasts
A second distinction is that proportionality fades in opposite, versus
adjacent, coast delimitations. 219 This differentiation is obvious when we
compare how proportionality was used in Libya-Malta and Jan Mayen
with its role in the mixed contexts of Tunisia-Libya, Gulf of Maine and
St.Pierre & Miquelon.
(c) Third-State Claims and External Projections
Where the delimitation does not cover the entire area within the
218.
[T]o take into account the extent of the respective coasts... is ...
mainly.., a means of checking whether a provisional delimitation established initially on the basis of other criteria ... satisfactory ....
[A] maritime delimitation can certainly not be established by a direct
division of the area in dispute proportional to the respective lengths of
the coasts.. . but ...

a substantial disproportion ...

call[s] for an ap-

propriate correction.
Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 185.
219. See e.g., North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, paras. 57-58; Anglo-French Arbitration, 16
I.L.M. 54, paras. 99, 182; Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 197. In its first case dealing exclusively with opposite coasts, the International Court of Justice reiterated this
primacy of the median line and commenced the delimitation on this basis before making
any adjustments. Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J. 13, para. 62. The dissenting judges would
have made no adjustments for proportionality, unless there was abnormal configuration
of the relevant coasts, id. para. 19 (Valticos, J., dissenting opinion); criticizing the 'unspecified impressions of equitableness,' id. para. 120 (Mosler, J., dissenting opinion); emphasizing that '[i]t is doubtful whether the test of proportionality has any place in the delimitation between purely opposite states,' id. para.184 (Schwebel, J., dissenting opiniion).
See also BOWETT, supra note 6, at 164
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200-mile radius, due to the potential claims of third states in the region,
such Italy in Libya-Malta, the ratio of coast to zones may arguably be
beyond reasonable calculability. 220 In addition, where some coasts also
project outside or beyond the delimitation area, it may become
necessary to determine how much they are already being used up or
partially satisfied. There are some hints in some separate opinions in
Jan Mayen that the more the coasts are satisfied elsewhere, the lesser
22 1
the necessity is of adjusting for disproportionality.
(d) Determining and Quantifying Gross Disproportion and
Making Corrections
Starting with opposite-coast situations in chronological order, the
result in the Anglo-French Arbitrationis very difficult to quantify. The
mainland coasts were comparable in length and dominated the
delimitation, 222 and over 90% of the total space would have been
allocated the same way under either proportionality or equidistance.
The Channel Islands would have more than doubled their alotted share
under equidistance, but would probably have received less if
proportionality were the only factor. Comparable figures come out of
the Atlantic region. The ICJ endorsed a localizing approach in that
proportionality "does not relate to the total partition of the area of shelf
among the coastal States concerned, its role being rather that of a
criterion to assess the distorting effect of particular geographical
features,223 and made the related cuts in the areas of the shorter
shores, those of the islands.
In the more recent opposite-coast cases, the grossness calculations
and the sizes of the corrections are easier to decipher, and are more
precise. In Libya-Malta, pure proportionality would have produced a
Libyan share eight times larger than that of Malta, while under
equidistance the shares would have been comparable in size. Thus, the
grossness factor was about eight. The ICJ first shifted the median line
to some extent in the direction of Malta, and then tested the outcome
for
reasonable
proportionality,
rejecting
any
predetermined
arithmetical ratio and concluding that no further reduction was
appropriate because, under "a broad assessment of the equitableness of
the result," there was no evident disproportion. 224 While this entire
220. Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J. 13, para. 74. See also id. para. 15 (Judge Oda dissenting opinion).
221. See Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, para. 92 (Oda, J., separate opinion); id. at 142
(Shahabuddeen, J., separate opinion).
222. Anglo-French Arbitration, 16 I.L.M. 54, para. 181.
223. Id. para. 250.
224. Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J. 13, paras. 74-75. Judges Ruda, Bedjaoui and de Arechaga wanted the line to move up a bit further, in essence giving Malta a three-quarters
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process was affected both by the proximity of the Northern littoral of
the Mediterranean (Italy)225 and the intrusion of potential claims of
third states, 226 and while the ICJ's explanations about the dimension of
the shift were not very revealing, 227 Malta ended up with roughly three
quarters of what it would have had in the delimitation area without
this shift. The ratio of shares to coast lengths in the delimited area
ended at roughly three to one, 228 so that a disproportion of more than
two to one was apparently found acceptable. In other words,
equidistance was given more than twice the weight of proportionality.
229
In Jan Mayen, under equidistance the shares of the overlap
would have been comparable whereas the coast-length ratios were
slightly over nine to one. 230 Such substantial disproportion called for
some correction, 231 by moving the median line to ensure an equitable
solution. 232 Since the coast of Greenland received extra satisfaction
elsewhere in the form of about two-thirds of one-quarter of the area
outside the overlap, 233 the grossness factor was roughly over seven,
comparable to the one in Libya-Malta. On that basis, Denmark claimed
the full 200 miles of the 254 miles between them. 234 The ICJ rejected

effect. Id. paras. 31, 35-38. Judge El Khani also would have supported a larger shift. Id.
at 59.
225. Id. para. 72.
226. Id. para. 74.
227. Id. para. 73. According to Judge Schwebel's dissenting opinion:
I cannot agree that the Court's cryptic references to the length of
coasts, the distance between coasts, the scarcity of basepoints, and the
general geographical context, suffice to justify the selection of the line
of delimitation it has chosen in this case. Nor do these arrested allusions conduce towards building the sense of consistency and predictability at which the Court and the law so rightly aim.
Id. at 187.
228. Judges Ruda, Bedjaoui and de Arechaga, in a separate opinion, claimed that the
Court's line produced a 2.38:1 ration (id. paras. 35-38), whereas Judge Schwebel put it as
3.8:1. Id. at 186. Judge Oda suggested a way of using equidistance in trapezoids and covering more total area between the two states to produce shelf ratios of between 2.3:1 and
4:1. Id. paras. 16-17 (Oda, J., dissenting opinion).
229. Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, paras. 18-21, 59.
230. The Court used two methods, both following straight lines across the coastal
fronts and producing results close to 9:1. The first counted the length of the fronts from
one end to the other along a single line (ratio: 9.2:1) and the second followed the successive baselines which had produced the median line (ratio: 9.1:1) Id. para. 61.
231. Id. para. 66.
232. Id. paras. 65-69.
233. Judge Oda argued that the median line should not be shifted unless there is disproportionality in the total areas allocated, not only in the overlapping regions. Id. para.
92 (Oda, J., separate opinion).
234. Id. paras. 62, 70. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Fischer would have honored
the Danish claim on a theory of proportionality. Id. at paras. 12-13.
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that claim and divided the area on the Jan Mayen side of the median
line, treated as disputed, apparently for proportionality, first one to
two. Another small segment was then added to the Greenland part in
zone one to equalize access to the fishing resources. Thus, a total
disproportion of the magnitude of at least three to one was tolerated. In
terms of this difference in results, it is fair to conclude that equidistance
weighed at least twice as much as proportionality.
Turning to the adjacencies or composite situations, in North Sea
equidistance would have produced a German share one-third the size of
the others, with the coastlines being comparable in length. The ICJ
considered this split inequitable. 235 Germany argued for a share larger
by about 65%, still lagging considerably in total area. Following
negotiations, Germany ended up with an even lesser share by roughly
one third. 236 In rounded figures, a grossness factor of close to two
prevailed. The other cases were factually more complex, and the
division of the delimitation area into sectors enabled the courts both to
differentiate between opposite and adjacent areas, and to locate the
corrections in distortion areas, even though typically the proportionality
expost test operated in a total fashion (i.e. to verify the equitableness of
the entire shares allocated to the parties). This selective location
approach also makes the incorporation of the tangential considerations
related to division of natural resources and no cut-offs possible . In
Tunisia-Libya, the dividing lines which awarded approximately 60% of
the entire sea-bed to Tunisia and 40% to Libya were found to satisfy the
proportionality test where the coast lengths stood in the approximate
ratios of 69-31 along the actual coastlines, and 66-34 across the coastal
fronts. 237 The only correction to the median line that was not related to
historical or to past-conduct reasons occurred in the opposite-coast
segment, by giving the Kerkennah Islands half effect. Without it, the
Tunisian share would have increased by less than 10%. The Tunisian
island of Jerba, located closer to the coast and ignored in drawing the
baselines, was treated as if it were a promontory attached to the coast
and was given comparable effect under proportionality. In these
circustances, it is virtually impossible to quantify a grossness factor. If,
as is apparently the case, the ICJ was thinking only of the lengths of
the opposite-coast segments, the correction is consistent with the
magnitudes tolerated in the other cases.
In Gulf of Maine, the Chamber had started using in all three
segments a process which basically drew median lines. Only in one
235. North Sea, 1969 L.C.J. 3, para. 91.
236. Treaty Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf under the North
Sea, Jan. 28, 1971, 857 U.N.T.S. 131, 155 reprintedin 1970-71 I.C.J. Y.B. 117.
237. Tunisia-Libya, 1982 I.C.J. 18, para. 131. See Feldman, supra note 208, at 219-
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segment did it engage in an empirical, common-sense kind of
proportionality adjustment exactly in the total coastal ratio of 1:1.32. A
look at the map shows that the effect of the correction was felt mostly in
the outer region and that, in total terms, it added less than 10% to the
total United States share. The Chamber did not consider what the total
share ratios would have been before and after the correction.
Guinea/Guinea-Bissauended up with equal shares for equal lengths
under a special kind of median line, so there was no disproportion to be
accounted for. In St. Pierre & Miquelon, the relevant coasts stood in the
ratio of over 15:1,238 and, under a rough equidistance, the grossness
factor came close to four. In one of the two sectors, a reasonable and
equitable zone for the islands met "to some degree the reasonable
expectations of France."23 9 It extended to the end of the contiguous zone
(24 miles) up to the median line, and operated close to equidistance for
about half the frontage. In the other sector, where the narrow coast of
the islands faced the open sea, a 188-mile frontal projection of the
islands beyond the territorial sea was recognized in parallel with
Newfoundland. The radial projections of both were prevented in order
to avoid a cut-off effect. 240 In the remaining small segment of the
easterly projection of St. Pierre, the line was fixed at 12 miles without
explanation or discussion. 241 The ICJ finally examined the lines under
both the catastrophic-repercussions-radical-inequity and the coastlength-disproportionality tests, and found them satisfactory. The ratio
of the shares came to about 16.4:1, thus certainly showing no
disproportion to the 15.3:1 coastal length ratio. In total figures, the
islands received about one quarter of their shares under equidistance.
Thus, the ICJ relied principally on proportionality in drawing the lines.
The ICJ hinted, however, that if only the opposite coasts counted, the
242
correction would have been different.
238. St. Pierre & Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. at 1162, para. 33. Judge Gotlieb, in a dissenting
opinion, disagreed with the measurements, claiming a minimum 21.4:1 ratio. He complained that the Court did not use the same degree of generalization for the coasts of each
party. Canada used 12 straight lines to reach 514.4 miles for its own coasts, for an average line of 42.9 miles, whereas the Court used three lines to measure the coast of the islands for an average line of 9.95 miles. Breaking up the Canadian coast the same way
would have pushed up the Canadian figure. Id. paras. 8-17 (Gotlieb, J., dissenting opinion). It was generally agreed that measuring along all sinuosities was not proper. Id.
para. 12.
239. Id. para. 69.
240. Id. paras. 70-71. Judge Weil, in a dissenting opinion, strongly opposed the distinction between frontal and radial projections. In his view, this strange concept has no
support either in state practice or in the cases. The outer limits of maritime jurisdiction
are commonly determined by the "arcs of circle method" on a given radius in all directions. Id. paras. 11-14.
241. Id. para. 71. Judge Weil wondered why an additional 12-miles zone was not recognized on the same basis as in the first sector. Id. para. 7 (Weil, J., dissenting opinion).
242. Id. paras. 72-73.
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These quantifications of grossness and correction may appear
somewhat brusque and simplistic, and may reflect more the outcome of
the cases than the doctrine, but they have decent explanatory power.
While any proposed figures may be challenged in a musical-chairs
fashion, the real question is whether it makes better sense to affix some
numbers on the slices of the pie and debate and defend them, than to
rely on chance and intuition.
By way of conclusion, the cases by and large support the
proposition that, given the priority and equitableness of equidistance,
the disproportion is not gross and needs no correction unless the result
between coasts and shares obtained under equidistance in the
particular region or sector is in excess of twice the coastal ratios in that
region or sector. All of the cases except St.Pierre & Miquelon can be
cited for at least that number. The fact that the French mainland was
too far to reinforce the claims of the islands may be part of the
explanation in St.Pierre & Miquelon. In any event, the later case of Jan
Mayen, with the ICJ behind it, gave substantially more weight to
equidistance than to proportionality in a similar situation. An auxiliary
proposition is that even where a correction must be made, it is limited
in that it does not seek to bring the ratio down to the non-grossness
level but only to moderate it. Another important point is that the
sectorization practices adopted by the courts enable them, in a microgeographic context, to localize a disproportionality at the initial stage,
and to correct it only there within the above parameters, as was done,
for example, in the Anglo-French Arbitration. Of course, this does not
preempt the ultimate use of the proportionality test for the total
picture. Finally, it would seem that the greater the distance between
the competing coasts, and therefore the more room to spare, the heavier
the weight of the proportionality factor. 243 It should be remembered
that the ICJ's concern about equidistance in North Sea centered on the
magnification of its effect in the outer regions. This is also reflected in
the different standards for the territorial sea under UNCLOS.

243. For example, in Libya-Malta, the shift was facilitated by the great distance between the coasts. Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J. 13, para. 73. Judge Mbaye, in a separate
opinion, took issue with this. Id. at 100-102. See also Schwebel, J., dissenting opinion, at
182. On the other hand Judge Valticos' separate opinion agreed with the majority. Id.
para. 23.
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2. The Mechanics of Adjusting Equidistance for Disproportionality
and Other Factors
(a) Establishing and Streamlining the Relevant Maritime Fronts
and Defining Their Projections
Recognizing the maritime front as the sole source of right is a
crucial, but only a first step toward boundary demarcation. The
relevant coast needs to be identified in terms of abutting on and facing
toward the area to be delimited. While this process is highly outcomedeterminative, in all cases except St.Pierre & Miquelon there had been
no major consequential disagreement on which coasts counted.
Next, choices must be made as to how the fronts project onto the
maritime spaces. Appurtenance calls for the allocation of the maritime
zones to the states in front of whose territory they lie. The frontal
projection of the coasts does not mean that they project only or
preferentially in the direction perpendicular to the general direction of
the maritime front. The basic rule is that every coastal front, regardless
of its length and orientation, projects equally in all directions up to 200
miles. The U.S. argument in Gulf of Maine that primary coasts project
more than secondary ones, or should be otherwise preferred, was
rejected by the Chamber, 244 and has not resurfaced. In St.Pierre &
Miquelon, the ICJ was equally unreceptive of the notion that shorter
coasts have diminished projections than longer ones under relative
reach. 245 But in making adjustments for other reasons such as
proportionality, frontal projections may be preferred over radial ones in
certain sectors, for example, on a 'cut off rationale, as was done in that
case.
(b) Pursuing the Details of Adjustment for Proportionality
(i) Measuring Lengths and Counting Sizes: Straight Lines v.
Sinuosities and Total v. Related Sea-Beds and Water
Columns
Judge Weil's doubts in St.Pierre & Miquelon on the math of
proportionality, which incidentally undermine its very validity, are
eloquent, albeit exaggerated:
How is [the] length [of the coasts] to be measured: by allowing for
the slightest sinuosity and calculating the perimeters of the deepest

244. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, at 36, 108.
245. St. Pierre & Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. 1145, paras. 43-45, 57-59.
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indentations and the longest promontories, or by following a general
direction that is more or less simplified and thus necessarily arbitrary?
And how should the contours, and hence the size, of the relevant area
246
be defined?.
However, without some such math we are chasing rainbows. Judge
Weil identified the two key proportionality issues. One, how do we
measure the coastal length? Two, what counts as a 'share'of the shelf?.
More particularly, does the share also include the sea-bed and the
water column of the territorial sea and the internal waters?
Streamlining the coasts starts, if possible, with the establishment
of their general direction, 247 and then of various basepoints at key
locations, joining them by drawing straight baselines, often divided into
sectors. 248 This is particularly evident in the drawing of the median
line. 249 The waters inside the baselines are treated as internal.
In North Sea, the ICJ assumed that "the length of [the] coast [will
be] measured in the general direction of the coastline" for

246. Id. para. 24. For his attack on 'the arithmetical equity of coastlines and areas' as
'blind and mechanistic proportionality' see id. para. 21.
247. See North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, paras. 89, 91, 98; Anglo-French Arbitration, 16
I.L.M. 54, at 251; Tunisia-Libya, 1982 I.C.J. 18, paras. 76, 93, 120 and paras. 77-102 (Arechaga, J., separate opinion); Guinea/Guinea-Bissau, 24 I.L.M. 267, paras. 97-98 (giving
the islands full effect in determining the crucial "coastal configuration and orientation");
Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J. 13, para. 70. See also Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, para. 61.
It should be pointed out that establishing the general direction of the coast does not necessarily mean that the dividing line must be parallel to it and even less to the abutting
land frontier. In Gulf of Maine, the Chamber rejected perpendicularity to the direction of
the coast where the two territories met or to the general direction of the coast, on the
ground that they were useful in drawing the dividing line only where the territories of the
two countries "lie successively along a more or less rectilinear coast, for a certain distance
at least." Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, paras. 175-76. However, it did draw perpendiculars in certain limited contexts.
248. See F. AHNISH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MARITIME BOUNDARIES AND THE
PRACTICE OF STATES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA 11-30 (1993), for a brief but informative

discussion on baselines [hereinafter AHNISH]. See generally Louis B. Sohn, Baseline Considerations, I.M.B. 153-161 (1993); Peter Beazley, Technical Considerationsin Maritime
Boundary Delimitations, I.M.B. 243-262 (1993).
Article 7 of UNCLOS provides for the discretionary deployment of straight baselines, from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, across the general direction of the
coast, where the coastline is deeply indented or there is a fringe of islands in its immediate vicinity. The system, however, has been used more broadly. Most states of the world,
with the significant exception of the United States of America, Japan and Greece, use
basepoints to draw straight baselines, and typically also the breadth of the continental
shelf and the exclusive zone are measured from the same baselines. See Jayewardene,
supra note 6, at 43-79, for the use of straight baselines regarding islands.
249. As stated in North Sea, "[Where the median line is used], the establishment of
one or more baselines.., can play a useful part in eliminating or diminishing the distortions that might result [from coastal anomalies]." North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 98.
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proportionality purposes. 25 0 This suggests straightening in front of the
sinuosities, but not necessarily with straight baselines. Tunisia-Libya
is the first case where the inclusion of the other waters in the
calculation of the size of the shares would have made a big difference, in
this instance against Tunisia. Here we find in the opinions significant
references to both of these issues. While conceding that the continental
shelf, in the legal sense, does not include the sea-bed areas below
territorial and internal waters, the ICJ noted that the coastal state does
enjoy sovereign rights for the purpose of exploiting their natural
resources. Since, for proportionality purposes, the lengths of the coasts
were measured in full and not along straight baselines, it was also
appropriate to include those additional areas in the shares . The only
absolute requirement of equity is that one should compare like with
like. 251 The ICJ undercut the cogency of its approach, however, by
emphasizing that this inclusion was not strictly required by
international law but was legitimized by the 'relevant circumstances' in
the case, including the fact that the parties here had not been
calculating their own related waters in the same way and in similar
configurations. 25 2 The ICJ measured the length of the coastlines once
along straight lines following the coast, but apparently technically not
straight baselines and once apparently along the sinuosities, coming up
with comparable results: 31:69 and 34:66.253 In the end, the ICJ
compared these extended lengths with the extended shares and found
254
them satisfactory.
In Gulf of Maine, the Chamber added up the total relevant
coastlines of Canada and the United States as measured along the
coastal fronts in straight lines in a number of segments, 255 not following
all their sinuosities. A major issue was how to measure the coasts of
the Canadian Bay of Fundy, whose wide mouth fronted on the Gulf.
The Chamber counted it as part of the Gulf up to the point where it
narrowed, so that it contained only maritime areas lying no more than
250. Id. para. 101(D)3.
251. Id. para. 104. Judge de Arechaga agreed in a separate opinion, "[that not to include those areas] would be to commit the sin of formalism; to allow that form of inequity
which the Romans called subtilitas, that is to say, an exaggerated adherence to the strict
letter of the law when equity demands a broader approach for the purposes of comparison." (Valticos, J., separate opinion). Id. para. 120. On the other hand, Judge Evensen
was quite critical, especially of the inclusion in the shares of the internal low-depth waters. Id. para. 23. Including the territorial waters in the calculation had originally been
suggested by Judge Bustamante y Rivero. (Bustamante y Rivero, J., separate opinion) Id.
para. 4.
252. Id. para. 103.
253. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 131. See also Judge Evensen, dissenting. Id.
para. 23.
254. Id. para. 131.
255. Id. para. 221.
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12 miles from the coast. 256 Consequently, its coast up to that point, plus
a line across the mouth of the Bay there, was included in the
proportionality calculus. 257 This inclusion had materially favorable
consequences for Canada. The Bay added only 7% to the entire sea area
but apparently increased the length of the Canadian coast by 93%!258
The straightening of the coastal fronts was adumbrated in LibyaMalta's perception that proportionality requires that "coasts which are
broadly comparable ought not to be treated differently because of a
technical quirk of a particular method of tracing the course of a
boundary line."259 The coasts were measured in straight lines to
260
produce the figures of 194 and 24 miles.
In St.Pierre & Miquelon, the ICJ measured the respective coasts
"by segments, according to their lines of general direction," not
following their sinuosities which would have favored Canada. 261 Judge
Gotlieb took the ICJ to task for relying on longer line segments for
Canada and shorter ones for the islands, thus reducing the disparity in
the ratios; 262 and Judge Weil referred to the elusive and arbitrary ways
of measuring lengths and shares to challenge proportionality
altogether. 263 With regard to the size of the shares awarded, the ICJ
relied on experts who calculated the relevant area, which was allocated
16.4:1 to Canada. 264 Finally, in Jan Mayen the measurement of the
relatively straight and parallel coastlines did not present a problem. 265
While there is some ambiguity on how to calculate the lengths of
lines, and especially the size of shares, for purposes of the
256. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 31.
257.
[Tihe fact that the two coasts opposite each other on the Bay of Fundy
are both Canadian is not a reason to disregard the fact that the Bay is
part of the Gulf of Maine, nor a reason to take only one of these coasts
into account for the purpose of calculating the length of the Canadian
coasts in the delimitation area. There is no justification for the idea
that if a fairly substantial bay opening on to a broader gulf is to be regarded as part of it, its shores must not belong all to the same State.
Id. para. 221.
258. Id. at 356 (Schwebel, J., separate opinion). Schwebel argued that the Chamber
should have considered the fact that in the past Canada had claimed that the entire Bay
contained 'internal waters.' Furthermore, the Chamber was accused of being inconsistent
by not making the same fine distinction in calculating the length of the inner coast of the
Massachusetts Bay. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, paras. 354-55.
259. Id. para. 56.
260. Id. para. 68.
261. Id. paras. 8-17 (Gotlieb, J., separate opinion).
262. Id. paras. 8-17 (Gotlieb, J., separate opinion)..
263. Id. para. 24 (Weil, J., dissenting opinion)..
264. Id. para. 93. Judge Gotlieb challenged in great detail the Court's position on
what constituted the relevant area. Id. paras. 34-37 (Gotlieb, J., dissenting opinion).
265. Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, paras. 89-93
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proportionality calculus, a couple of things stand out as sensible and
grounded in the cases. First and foremost, there must be congruity
between the criteria that determine lengths and those that define
shares. If territorial and even internal sea areas are included in the
shares, then the coast lines that generate them should also be included
in the lengths, and vice-versa. On the merits, the explanation offered in
Tunisia-Libya, the only case that dealt explicitly with issue, of why the
territorial and internal waters may be included in the size of the shares
is sketchy and unconvincing. The definition of the shelf and the
exclusive zone could not be clearer: areas "beyond ... the territorial
sea." 266 Internal waters are defined as those "on the landward side of
the baseline of the territorial sea."267 By what logic are those spaces to
be counted in determining the size of the shelf and zone shares? To be
sure, the coastal state has exploitation rights in these sea-beds and
water columns. But these rights not only arise from a different source,
but they have different content: they are not shelf and exclusive zone
rights, and they trigger the exercise of higher or full sovereignty.
Furthermore, the sovereignty over these waters preceded by centuries
the recognition of the new rights to extended maritime spaces. Thus,
the titles differ in all important respects. The only community is
factual: they all relate to areas under the surface of the water. This
should not suffice to justify penalizing a state for the geography of its
coasts. Second, the coastlines may be divided into sectors and/or be
measured in segments, reflecting the directions of the front and
reducing indentation, with localized straightening, to avoid disparities
between the shares of territorial belts and the shelves. Indeed, we find
here perhaps the kernel of an idea that could prove quite useful as a
surrogate in taking account the length of the fronts. Assuming that we
use the same standards and methods for establishing the territorial
belts and for minimizing the internal waters, a reasonable test of
proportionality should be that the median line has produced shelf and
exclusive zone areas which are not grossly out of line with the total
ratio of territorial belts. In any event, whatever approach is chosen
should apply in a neutral fashion, equally and consistently to the coasts
and shares of all parties.
(ii) Where to Draw the Lines: Symmetry?
Jan Mayen addressed the issue of symmetry in some detail. To
explain why a small segment of the line was moved in a different
manner than the others, the ICJ stated:
So far as the continental shelf is concerned, there is no requirement
266. UNCLOS, arts. 55, 76.
267. Id. art. 8.
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that the line be shifted eastwards consistently throughout its length: if
other considerations might point to another form of adjustment, to
adopt it would be within the measure of discretion conferred on the ICJ
by the need to arrive at an equitable result. For the fishery zones,
equitable access to the resources of the southern part of the area of the
overlapping claims has to be assured by a substantial adjustment or
268
shifting of the median line provisionally drawn in that region.
This now confirms what was implicit in all important cases, that
the line need not be moved equally along its entire length and that
varying approaches can be used in different sectors, taking into
account, if and as appropriate, whether the shelf and/or the zone is
delimited, and taking into account tangential considerations such as
location of natural resources, non-encroachment and no cut-offs.
Within each sector, however, the tendency is to move in a consistent
manner. Total symmetry is not present where some reduced effect or
enclaving is attributed to some coasts, such as in St.Pierre & Miquelon.
On another issue, we may even detect a preference for adjusting in
favor of frontal versus radial projections, although the nature of the
projection does not affect the dimensions of the calculation.
The availability of judicial remedial discretion in line-drawing does
not mean, however, that it should be exercised arbitrarily or at random.
It should be presumed that, in the absence of any articulated and
sufficient factors justifying a departure, symmetry should be the rule as
more consistent both with the notion of appurtenance based on distance
and with neutrality.
(iii) Where to Draw the Lines : Why Not Equi-Ratio?
Practical wisdom requires an effort for the unity of shares and the
avoidance of odd shapes or zig-zag lines. Furthermore, if there is one
field in which an equitable solution is most useful and consecrated, it is
in the fashioning of flexible remedies for concrete needs.
The
asymetrical and protruding mushroom shape of the French zones in
St.Pierre & Miquelon makes little sense. To be sure, the ICJ wanted to
demonstrate that islands have full rights by giving them some 200-mile
zones. The differentiation of methods by sectors, here semi-enclaving,
there equidistancing, is also within reason. But why not devise some
technique to construct zones that make geographical sense?
One sensible method for synthesizing equidistance
and
proportionality is equiratio, developed by a Dutch hydrographer, 269

268. Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, para. 90.
269. Wijnand Langeraar, Maritime Delimitation: The Equiratio Method A New Approach,MARINE POL'Y 10, 3-18 (1986).
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which works both where a small island faces a massive nearby coast,
such as in St.Pierre & Miquelon, and in difficult adjacent state
delimitations. In the former situation, equidistance normally creates a
parabola which keeps opening as we move backward toward the open
sea. Under equiratio, the 1/1 equidistance parabola can be replaced by
an ellipse maintaining a constant ratio of distances from the nearest
points of the baselines, the dimensions of which can be changed
according to a scale, such as 9/10, 4/5, or 7/10, to reflect a
proportionality correction. Another way of describing equiratio is to
state that the distance part of equi-distance is transformed from 1:1 to
9:10, for example. Applying this technique to Libya-Malta, a .74/1
equiratio would have produced a line very close to the one constructed
by the ICJ,270 which can be interpreted as giving the proportionality
factor a 25% weight. A 9/10 equiratio comes close to explaining the
outcome in North Sea, as finally negotiated, and in Libya-Tunisia,
giving full weight to the islands. 27' The beauty of equiratio is threefold. First, it helps us bring out to the open and explain what the courts
did both in terms of quantification and of where the lines were drawn.
Thus, we are on the way of constructing guidelines for future
boundaries. Second, it largely by-passes the confusing and unprincipled
apparent discrimination against islands while it does a better job in
effectuating the rationale behind those attempted distinctions. Third, it
provides a model for drawing viable and sensible lines, especially
curved, oval ones, around islands, with or without enclaving, avoiding
272
rather grotesque shapes such as the one in St.Pierre & Miquelon.
When additional considerations must be taken into account,
appropriate deviations may be made ex post.
V. SPECIAL ISSUE : THE STATUS OF ISLAND COASTAL FRONTS
The second doctrinal wrong turn in delimitations, largely due to the
confusion generated by the first one, the escape to equity, concerns the
treatment of islands. Here, we are confronted with what appears as a
On the one hand, the
major and irreconcilable contradiction.
international treaties and the cases uniformly recognize the equal
status and rights of all coastal territory, including that of islands. 273 On
the other hand, we find in some cases what appears to be the short-

270. Id. at 16-18.
271. Id. at 8-14.
272. The way that dissenting Judge Gotlieb discussed the drawing of borders in St.
Pierre & Miquelon suggests that he would have been receptive to the equiratio technique,
albeit in less generous terms. See St. Pierre & Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. at 1186-1189, 1191,
paras. 29-38, 47
273. However, rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life are excluded. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 121.3.
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changing of minor or small islands through lesser effect, movement
back or enclaving. State practice reflects similar results. Is there
perhaps some equitable way of reconciling these two positions?
At the outset, one is hard put even to articulate a logical or policy
reason for why the extent to which a particular territory of the coastal
state is surrounded by water should be relevant in determining its
continental shelf and economic zone rights. Remember, these rights
derive from, and depend solely on, appurtenance on the territory having
a coastal front. All islands have coastal fronts. These coastal fronts
face equally toward the areas to be delimited. Of course, depending on
the respective coastal fronts, the shares of islands, like the shares of
other territory, may be different (that is larger or smaller) than those of
a particular mainland or of another island. For example, even under
equidistance, the share of Jan Mayen came to about only one-half the
size of the share of Greenland. This was unrelated to the islandmainland characterization. Is there any other basis for the lesser
treatment of island coastal fronts? Why should it matter whether, for
example, Malta is separated by sea from or is connected to the northen
littoral?
In addition, setting islands apart creates serious practical problems
of administration. To begin with, what is an island? The major
continents of the earth are technically islands.
Should Malta be
classified as island but Cyprus or Great Britain or Greenland or
Australia not? Should a promontory surrounded 90% by water be
treated in a similar way? 274 Another difficult problem is whether all, or
only some, islands should be diminished. If only some should be, which
ones, why, in what way and how much? In other words, are some
islands more equal than others? 275 In particular, should it matter
whether an island, but not other territory, is politically independent? 276

274. See Anglo-French Arbitration, 16 I.L.M. 54, para. 244.
275. The wide shelf areas with plenty of islands which exist in many places on earth,
also indicate that it would be a very difficult task in practice to establish criteria for distinguishing between islands entitled to a shelf of their own and other islands. Lars Delin,
Shall Islands Be Taken Into Account When Drawingthe Median Line According to Article
6 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf?, 41 NORDS. INT. RET. 205, 208 (1971).
276. The references to political independence appear inconclusive. In the AngloFrench Arbitration, the Court stated that the Channel Islands "only as islands of the
United Kingdom, not as semi-independent States," Anglo-French Arbitration, 16 I.L.M.
54, para. 186, have "their own entitlement to continental shelf separate from the United
Kingdom." Id. para. 190. In Libya-Malta, Malta's argument that as an 'island State' it
had some sort of special status was rejected. Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J. 13, para. 53. See
Bowett, supra note 6, at 133-34, for a discussion on the ambiguities of Anglo-French Arbitration and Libya-Malta. The most unequivocal statements against different treatment
appear in St. Pierre & Miquelon:
In the view of this Court there are no grounds for contending that the
extent of the maritime rights of an island depends on its political
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After so many adjudications and settlements over a long period,,
most of which involved islands, and with the help of so many relevant
texts, the time is ripe to move beyond the ad hoc indeterminacy of
impressionism. It is time to search for the rhyme and reason of any
special rules applicable to islands, as well as, some method of carrying
them out. 277 Many future delimitations involve islands in complicated
geographical patterns, 278 and some guidelines are desperately needed.
The literature on this topic is a bit dated, as it was written mostly
before St.Pierre & Miquelon and Jan Mayen, the major island cases,
and it tends to be mostly descriptive. For lack of a better explanation,
some commentators sought the reason for the different treatment of
islands in their location, in how close they were to the coasts of their
own versus the other states. Is this the right path?
A. The Conventions
First, both Article 1 of the Geneva Convention and Article 121.2 of
UNCLOS solemnly recognize that islands enjoy equal status and equal
continental shelf and exclusive zone maritime rights with any other
configuration of territory.
This position received a boost when all attempts by delegates from
certain nations at the Third UN Law of the Sea Conference, which
produced UNCLOS, to reduce, circumscribe, and even eliminate, in

status. No distinction in this respect is made by Article 121, paragraph 2 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea or by the corresponding provisions of the 1958 Conventions ....
St. Pierre & Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. 1145, para. 49.
However, non-independence may affect the mechanics of drawing the lines since the inclusion of an island, as of any other non-independent territory, in an overall delimitation
may have an impact, for example, reflecting considerations of proportionality to the total
coast lengths. It should also be mentioned here that the past debates, especially in UN
contexts, on the special status of islands under 'foreign' control located near the coasts of
states freed from colonial domination, which remain in any event inconclusive, have no
impact on the general issue of island maritime entitlements. See SYMMONS, supra note 6,
at 57-60
277. Compare, Charney, Progress,supra note 4, at 256, n. 153, stating that:
There are grounds to demur [to Judge Weeramantry's argument in
Jan Mayen that it is too early for conveyance toward more determinative law]. In the last 50 years, there have been more separate international adjudications and arbitrations on this subject of public international law than any other. Furthermore, approximately one-third of
the potential maritime boundaries have already been settled by
agreement or otherwise. If now is too early, when would it be time?
278. Many of the Central East Asian maritime boundaries can be so classified. See
e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, Central East Asian Maritime Boundaries and the Law of the
Sea, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 724-749 (1995).
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certain contexts, island rights were resoundingly rejected. 279 These
proposals focused primarily on location and the more drastic ones would
have eliminated tout court the entitlements of islands situated closer to
another state:
Islands which are situated on the continental shelf of another state, or
which on the basis of their geographical location affect the normal
continental shelf or EEZ of another
state shall have no economic zone
280
or continental shelf of their own.

Turkey had also made a separate complex proposal eliminating the
rights of smaller islands providing that an island:
situated in the economic zone or the continental shelf of other States
shall have no economic zone or continental shelf of its own if it does not
contain at the least one tenth of the land area and population of the
281
State to which it belongs'.
A subsequent proposal, which addressed the broader category of
non-adjacent islands but which was more limited in scope and reach,
provided that the maritime spaces of such islands:
shall be delimited on the basis of relevant factors taking into account
equitable criteria.... These equitable criteria should normally relate to
(a) the size of these normally formed areas of land (b) their
geographical configuration and their geological and geomorphological
structure (c) the needs and interests of the population living thereon (d)
the living conditions which prevent a permanent
settlement
of
population (e) whether these islands are situated within, or in the
proximity of, the maritime space of another state (f) whether, due to
their situation far from the coasts, they may influence the equity of the
28 2
delimitation.' (emphasis added).

Note that all of these criteria (size, geomorphology, needs and
interests of population, living conditions, and even location as such)
have been either explicitly rejected, or have not been taken into
consideration in the prior cases. This stance is even more clearly
reflected in the subsequent cases. UNCLOS did not even include any
provisions that qualified the maritime rights of islands in the context of
279. See generally SYMMONS, supra note 6, at 94-100 (discussing the early phases).
These early proposals were intended to promote national interests rather than to reflect
an opinio juris and not one of them was incorporated in or affected in any way the final
text of UNCLOS. KARL, supra note 6, at 645. It is also to be remembered that Iranian
and Italian proposals in the negotiations leading to the Geneva Convention to discount
islands were heavily defeated in 1953.
280. AICONF.62/c.2/L 96 (proposed by nine states).
281. Id. at L.55 (Article 3.2).
282. Id. at L.62, Rev. 1.
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a semi-enclosed sea. 28 3 This decisive and generalized defeat of all these
qualifications also established, beyond doubt, especially after the
demise of the natural prolongation concept, that islands as such
situated near another state are not themselves just special
circumstances sitting on such state's shelf. 28 4 Rather, they have full
entitlements either on their own, or in conjunction with other territory
fronting on the delimitation area.

B. The Cases and the Commentators
Beside the texts of the Conventions, we find in the cases many
authoritative, unequivocal assertions that islands have the same rights
as any other territory. 28 5 Indeed, we cannot find a single unambiguous
judicial statement qualifying or reducing the entitlements of islands as
such. This suggests that Article 121.2 of UNCLOS codifies customary
international law.
Why, then, in many cases and in a good number of state
settlements do we find in certain islands' situations diminished shelves
and zones below the equidistance reduction, drawn without much
explanation beyond the notion that 'I know equity when I see it?' Is
there some logic, some principle, or some practical wisdom underlying
this differentiation beside an a priori lesser entitlement of islands as
such? Is proportionality perhaps the explanation for these situations?
Many commentators did not seriously pursue that explanation. One
reason was that courts and states have been hesitant to give that much
explicit weight to proportionality. The other reason was that many
283. As had been proposed by Turkey (A/CONF.62/C.2/L.55) and this despite the fact
that UNCLOS recognizes the concept of an "enclosed or semi-enclosed" sea (Part IX, Article 122-123) and provides for certain duties of cooperation and coordination of the littoral
states. Incidentally, the irrelevance of that concept in boundary formation is reflected in
Libya-Malta where the International Court of Justice referred to the entire Mediterranean as being a "semi-enclosed sea" and still applied the same general criteria of delimitation. Id. para. 47. This, of course, does not mean that, where proportionality adjustments are being made in tight quarters, the radial projections of shorter coasts may be
where the cuts are to be made. Cf. Evans, supra note 199, at 686.
284. As explained by Judge Schwebel in his separate opinion in Jan Mayen:
The acceptance of islands as a special circumstance in the travaux
preparatoires (of the Geneva Convention) plainly refers to islands
whose situation or size or other characteristics may constitute a special circumstance in a delimitation between two other coasts; an island
was not conceived to be of itself a special circumstance which affects
its own coastal projections. That concept is so bizarre that naturally it
finds no expression in the intentions of those who drafted the 1958
Convention.
Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, at 121-23. See also Karl, supra note 6, at 651
285. This position was recognized early in no lesser case than North Sea, 1969 I.C.J.
3, para. 57; see also JAYEWARDENE, supra note 6, at 344.
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commentators mentally focused on the model of two mainland states,
first dividing maritime spaces of less than 400 total miles between their
coasts, then adding islands on the map to see what effect they would
have on the delimitation. In that context, it is easy to understand why
the island distance criterion became relevant, and why it made sense to
classify the islands into three categories: islands close to their own
mainland, islands straddling the median line, and islands closer to the
other state's mainland. The rhetoric associated with this locational
approach proceeded to label islands as being on the wrong side of the
median line, or deflecting it excessively or distorting the geographical
situation. Once this characterization is accepted, it sounds sensible
28 6
that such islands should be pushed back to their proper place.
It seems to me that this approach not only reflects false
assumptions, but fails to guide us toward a method for the resulting
adjustments. The idea of islands being at the wrong place or on the
wrong side assumes that we have predetermined where the right side
lies. Perhaps the Creator, or nature, first generated the mainlands and
endowed them with their entitlements, and then mistakingly, or at
least inadvertently, cast the islands where they do not belong. With
equal plausibility we could argue the reverse, that after the sea came
the islands and the continents constitute misplaced latecomers. The
absurdity of this distinction is only further strengthened by the fact
that it does not take size into account, so that an island would come
second even where its coast is longer than that of the mainland. It is
apparent that this approach not only begs the question, but violates the
cardinal rule of delimitation, that geography should not be refashioned.
The second, fatal, flaw of this explanation is that it tells us nothing
about how much and where the island shares should be diminished. We
need a measuring rod to determine how much deflection of the normal
line is excessive or distortive, as well as a technique of correction. (How
much lesser effect (a half, a third?), and how (e.g. movement back?) and
when is partial or full enclaving justified instead, and of what size?)
Excessiveness or distortion presuppose that we know what is proper
and normal. As explained earlier, most of the typical characteristics of
a piece of territory, including an island, such as landmass, population,
economic need and political status have been eclipsed as relevant
factors. The distance-to-its-own-versus-to another-mainland idea which
underlies the wrong place argument not only lacks legal authentication

286. This approach was cultivated especially by Karl, supra note 6, at 651, 654-63 and
Pazarci, supra note 6, at 92, 246, 257, 327, 336. It has also been elaborated by
JAYEWARDENE, supra note 6, at 349-70. The latter author refined the classification, creating seven categories of islands: coastal, offshore, offlying, right-side, astride the median
line, wrong-side and detached. Id. at 366-70.
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379

but also it is difficult to manage. 28 7
It follows that where the 200-mile radius from a mainland, or for
that matter from another island with competing claims, extends to shelf
or to exclusive zone waters behind a distant island, all sides of such
island facing toward the same areas should count. There is no such
thing as a natural back side of a distant island. As the competing
mainland coast is counted first to share the in-between space with the
inner side of the island, and then again to share in full the outer space
with the external side of the island, all sides of the island constitute
relevant coasts. 28 8 The concerns expressed about islands projecting in
more directions than mainlands, especially straight ones, and thus a
mile of an island coast getting more mileage than a mainland mile, 289
287. Karl's approach, including the basepoint dimension, is to recognize genuine shelf
rights only to islands lying close to their own mainland, to independent insular states and
to distant islands on the wrong side. Karl, supra note 6, at 654-61 and at 669, n. 108.
This bundling not only brings in the questionable factor of independence but leads to the
paradox that far off distant islands fare better than such islands within 400 miles of their
mainland! As for the remaining islands, Karl further subdivides them into 'substantial'
ones (more or less 25% of the territory of the state) and the rest, and short changes the
rest by providing for them only territorial waters, giving the benefit of the proportionality
factor only to substantial islands. Id. at 662-64. The Karl approach is not plausible either in its classifications or in its outcomes. See also Jayewardene, supra note 6.
288. While the cases contain little explicit language on this issue, mostly because it
did not really matter in most contexts, there is nothing to suggest a different approach.
In the Anglo-French Arbitration, as well as in Gulf of Maine, the length of the coasts of
the islands was insignificant and the proportionality adjustment was very gross. It would
appear that the treatment of the coastal front of the islands in St. Pierre & Miquelon is
consistent with the position taken in the text. Indeed, the Court included in the proportionality measurements all sides of the French islands except those that fronted on the
area charted by the 1972 territorial sea delimitation agreement between the two countries. By the same token, however, the Canadian coasts facing the same area were
equally excluded. St. Pierre & Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. 1145, paras. 30-33; cf. paras. 8-25
(Gotlieb, J., dissenting opinion).
This issue has also escaped the attention of the publicists. Karl is not sufficiently explicit:
on the one hand, he agrees that the "measure of an island's size for the purpose of delimitation is... the length of [its] coastline," and clarifies in his footnote that we count "the
amount of coastline that borders the area to be delimited," suggesting a total measurement. Karl, supra note 6, at 663, n. 86. On the other hand, he adds that "the maximum
length of an island would be an appropriate measure of the length of the island's coastline," id., and it is not clear that he includes all sides facing the delimitation areas in his
mathematical calculations for the Aegean.
Of course, when the overlapping claims do not extend to the sea areas 'behind' an island
or group of islands, as happened, for example, in Jan Mayen, Libya-Malta, and
GuinealGuinea-Bissau, we count only the front side of the island, plus the lateral sides as
appropriate. While, for the Aegean, Karl apparently takes in only the northern coastline
of the Greek island of Crete, this is justifiable since the other side of Crete does not border
on the area under delimitation. Id. at 671-72, n.116
289. Pazarci has been arguing that it is inequitable for an island to project in four directions when the mainland projects in fewer, maybe only one. Pazarci, supra note 6, at
289-90, 307-08.
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are taken care of by the proportionality adjustment, as will be explained
below.
In the opposite situation, where an island is situated along its own
mainland, foreclosing the latter's projection to the outer area, and
where the water space between them is less than the internal waters
plus the double breadth of the territorial sea, that is less than 24 miles
from the baselines, both inner coasts should not count for shelf and
exclusive zone purposes, and the external side of the island should
constitute the relevant maritime front. 290 The same logic applies within
a group of islands, as was recognized in Guinea/Guinea-Bissau. In the
Bijagos Archipelago, the nearest island was two miles from its
mainland, the furthest island was 37 miles away, and no two islands
were further apart than five miles. Without the islands, the length of
the coasts would have been 128-154.291 Counting the perimeter of each
would have transformed the shorter coast into a much longer one. The
292
Tribunal took into account only the outer perimeter of the group.
This is sensible since the coast of a group of islands should not be
considered to be longer than if the water space between them was land.
An evaluation of the outcomes in the cases and of most settlements
shows that the island-distance criterion lacks explanatory power. The
adjudicated boundaries which appear to disfavor islands are reflective
of two quite unexceptional ideas: first, the natural diminution of the
shares of shorter shores under equidistance, 293 and second, the further
correction for gross disproportionality to total coastal fronts. This
produces moves of islands back, or downgrades in establishing base
points for the total shelf and zone, or half-enclaves or even total
enclaves in proper circumstances, for example, with small, minor
islands far off their main coast. All these particularizations, when
properly executed, are not inconsistent with the full rights of islands to
the maximum limit of 200 miles in all directions of all coastal fronts. A
more particularized analysis of the cases indeed supports the
proportionality-adjustmentexplanation.
In the Anglo-French Arbitration,where the whole thing started, the
ICJ accepted the position that islands have full continental shelf
rights. 294 However, the presence of these islands, by virtue of their
particular geographical circumstances, led to modification of the strict

290. In Tunisia-Libya, there was no question that only the front of the Kerkennahs
counted and this is consistent with the position reflected in the text. Tunisia-Libya, 1982
I.C.J. 18. Cf. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 269-70, 335-36, paras. 31, 221.
291. Guinea/Guinea-Bissau, 24 I.L.M. 267, para. 95(b).
292. Id. para. 97.
293. See, e.g., Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, , at 174-75 (Shahabuddeen, J., separate
opinion); Id. at para. 92 (Oda, J., separate opinion).
294. Anglo-French Arbitration, 16 I.L.M. 54, paras. 158, 190-94.
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equidistance line, which would have given most of the Channel shelf
and an inordinate portion of the near-Atlantic shelf to Great Britain.
The reasoning is rather clear: reduced effect to the islands was only the
result of an adjustment to correct disproportionality to coast lengths
equitably. 295 No other type of proportionality surfaced as potentially
relevant. 296 The references to the islands being detached from their
mainland and on the wrong side of the median line related to the
creation of a radical distortion of the boundary, not to their being
islands. 297 Indeed, the ICJ would have treated the Scilly Isles the same
way had they been a promontory. 298 The source of the distortion was the
perception that the shares of the shelf should not be manifestly
disproportionate to the length of the relevant coastlines, which were
comparable in this case. 299 Enclaving or half-effect for islands is just an
adjustment technique applicable to shorter coastlines. For the Channel
Islands, enclaving was just the practical solution. 30 0 If they had been
closer to Great Britain, or if they stretched out one after another long
distances from the mainland, another technique would have been to
30 1
divert the course of the mid-Channel median line toward France.
Alternatively, if there had been more space in the area, the islands
could have received the benefits of equidistance, compensating France
by shifting the line in the other regions in its favor under a total
adjustment approach. 302 In the Atlantic region, with more space to

295. Id. para. 202.
296. The Court suggested in dicta that proportionality is a more general concept, extending to other potentially relevant geographical features or configurations, but none
appeared on the scene in this case. Id. paras. 99- 100.
297. Id. para. 199.
298. Id. paras. 244, 250.
299. The Court referred to the 'equality of the two States in their geographical
relation to the continental shelf of the Channel' with coast lengths of about 300 miles
each, to the disturbance by the islands of the 'balance of the geographical circumstances'
and to the 'substantial diminution of the area of continental shelf which would otherwise
accrue to the French Republic,... prima facie a circumstance creative of inequity and
calling for e method of delimitation that in some measure redresses this inequity.' Id. at
paras. 181, 195, 183, 196. For the near-Atlantic region, the logic was the same. Id. paras.
243-244.
300. The Court was apparently also aided in its approach of enclaving the Channel
islands by the perception that Great Britain had agreed with the notion that there were
two separate delimitations, not one total. Consequently, it treated the island question in
a three-way manner as if Great Britain itself was claiming against the islands, in which
case the concept of enclaving would have been meaningless, but the shortness of the
shores of the islands would have counted heavily against them when measured against
the opposite French coast. Id. paras. 190, 201-02. France's proportionality argument also
envisaged the possibility of treating the islands in a similar 'micro-geographical' way on
the basis both of the actual lengths of the coasts and of the maritime facades. Id. para.
166.
301. Anglo-French Arbitration, 16 I.L.M. 54, para. 199; see also id. para. 177
302. The Court suggested that this approach was appropriate for situations such as
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spare, there was only a half-effect proportionality correction, 30 3 to offset
the fact that the Scilly Islands projected the English coast twice as far
30 4
into the ocean as the corresponding French island of Ushant.
Two islands played a role in Tunisia-Libya: the Kerkennahs and
Jerba. Their status as islands did not remove them from consideration
as claimants to the maritime areas. 30 5 The ICJ concluded, however,
that using a median line approach amounted to giving the islands too
much weight, as this approach straightened the coastline seaward fully
in front of the Kerkennahs, which were located close to their own state,
(thus adding a big chunk of ocean space to Tunisia's share, 30 6) and made
the waters behind them internal waters. 307 While the ICJ did not
elaborate on what created this excessiveness, the context points to
proportionality. To correct it, the ICJ drew two coastal lines, one giving
these islands full effect, and another ignoring them. The ICJ then cut
the resulting area in half,30 8 thus notionally moving them half-way back
toward the coast. 30 9 With regards to the Tunisian island of Jerba, the
ICJ gave it full effect, as if it were a promontory, but concluded that the
other factors in the first sector overrode its projection, as they also did
310
certain other projections of the mainland.
Two minor questions relating to islands arose in Gulf of Maine. In
the segment where the proportionality adjustment was to be made, the
Chamber recognized that Seal Island, a small island near the Canadian

St. Pierre and Miquelon where the abundant oceanic spaces left room for compensatory
adjustment. Id. para. 200. It is an interesting question whether the actual St. Pierre &
Miquelon decision, rendered much later, can be explained in those terms
303. Id. para. 249.
304. Id. para. 251.
305. Tunisia-Libya, 1982 I.C.J. 18, para. 79. See also R.D. Hodgson, The TunisioLibyan ContinentalShelf Case, CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1, 16, 28-29 (1984).
306. Tunisia-Libya, 1982 I.C.J. 18, paras. 78, 122, 124.
307. Id. para. 128.
308. Id. paras. 128-129.
309. Even this limited reduction of the rights of the Kerkennahs was controversial.
Three judges disagreed, but a fourth judge would give them no effect at all. Judge Gros
disputed the presence of disproportionality and castigated the Court because "in sum, the
This
Tunisian coastline was effaced ... as if some geographical features did not exist ....
is a perfect example of trying to unmake geography." Id. paras. 14-15. According to
Judge Evensen, giving half-effect to these islands, whose size approaches that of Malta
and which form an archipelago, without an explanation about 'excessiveness,' violates the
equitable principle of not refashioning nature. Id. paras. 17, 19. Judge Schwebel also
criticized the lack of explanation of the notion of 'excessive weight.' Id. at 99. On the
other hand, Judge Oda was wedded to the notion of straightening the coastlines before
applying equidistance moderated with proportionality, calculated in the general direction
of the coast. Id. paras.169-72, 179, 183-87.
310. Id. paras. 79, 131.
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coast, was entitled to full maritime rights but refused to locate
basepoints on it because "it would be excessive to treat the coastline of
Nova Scotia as transferred south-westwards [forward] by the whole of
the distance between [it] and that coast." 311 The solution, quite
generous in result, was to give the island half-effect for a transverse
displacement of the median line. 312 The U.S. island of Nantucket fell
outside the delimitation area, as the ICJ did not use strict equidistance, 313 but rather drew a median line following the general direction
of the Massachusetts coast parallel to Nova Scotia. However, since the
parties had already agreed that Nantucket was to be used as the
farthest U.S. point in drawing the closing line that separated the inner
and outer Gulf,31 4 its location shifted that line in the direction of
Canada. Thus, its indirect impact was significant.
The Tribunal in Guinea/Guinea-Bissau had to deal with three
categories of islands. First, it had to contend with the islands close to
the coast of Guinea-Bissau. Second, it had to deal with the Bijagos
Islands Archipelago of Guinea-Bissau, consisting of many islands
within two to 37 miles of the coast and five miles of each other. Within
this inner region, the ICJ treated all of the water as territorial. Both
sets of islands were treated as mainlands for purposes of determining
the crucial "coastal configuration and orientation,"' 31 5 and "the general
direction of the entire coastline of the country," 31 6 and therefore, the
coastal projection and the drawing of baselines. In addition, their
seaward projection (but not their entire perimeter, since they were
treated like promontories) was counted in determining the length of the
coastlines. This treatment of the Bijagos alone added 20% to the
Guinea-Bissau coast length, and brought it to the same level as that of
Guinea. 317 The third category consisted of a few islands scattered in
shallow waters closer to Guinea, the most important one being the
Guinean island of Alcatraz. 318 The Tribunal recognized their maritime
rights. 319 Using equidistance and a southern limit line derived from a
treaty, the Tribunal considered Alcatraz, which was located only 2.25
miles on the right side of that line, as a factor of delimitation on its own,
311. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 222.
312. Id.
313. Counting it and Cape Cod under strict equidistance would have increased the
U.S. maritime zones by roughly eight times their land area in the outer region. See Jan
Schneider, The Gulf of Maine Case: The Nature of an Equitable Result, 79 AM. J. INT'L L.
539, 558 (1985). Canada had proposed that they be ignored under equidistance. Gulf of
Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 182.
314. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 33.
315. Guinea/Guinea-Bissau, 24 I.L.M. 267, para. 98.
316. Id. para. 97.
317. Id.
318. Id. para. 95.
319. Id.
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and gave it territorial waters of 12 miles extending above the line. As
this shifted the entire line for a considerable length, its effect on the
delimitation of the shelf and exclusive zone exceeded by far the 12-mile
limit.
In Libya-Malta, the parties had already agreed that "the
entitlement to continental shelf is the same for an island as for
mainland." 320 This equality means that their coasts are subject to the
same adjustments for distortions, such as disproportionality of shares to
coastal lengths. 321 It was this factor, in the context of the proximity to
the northern littoral of the Mediterranean, that justified shifting the
median line northward.
If there ever was a case where a couple of small islands standing
very close to a massive mainland, and without any geographical support
from their own mainland, arrogantly claimed equal treatment, it was
St.Pierre & Miquelon! Yet, the ICJ rejected the idea that their share
was to be reduced because they were purportedly superimposed on the
323
Canadian continental shelf, 322 or because they were not independent.
By the way, Newfoundland itself is as much of an island as St.Pierre
and Miquelon! 324 No, islands should not be enclaved within their
territorial sea; 325 and yes, they have the potential of generating full 200mile zones. 326 No, the location of potential hydrocarbon resources has
no bearing on this delimitation. 327
Judge Weil applauded this
treatment of islands which, in his view, abandons the impossible and
internally contradictory theory of special geographical circumstances
and constitutes, therefore, a milestone. 328 With this case, any doubts
about the equal treatment of islands have been laid to rest.
Finally, in Jan Mayen, Denmark had not even argued that Jan
Mayen, which is basically an uninhabited island resembling a rock, had
320. Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J. 13, para. 52. The Court recognized, however, the possibility that the coasts of an independent states, be it an island or other kind of territory,
may have a different relationship to the neighboring coasts than the same coasts if they
belonged to the same state.
321. Cf. Judge Oda's view that the effect of "narrow promontories of peninsulas or
even of islands" might be mitigated in "settling the basepoints on coastlines." Id. para.
68. See also id. para. 70.
322. "[S]ince it is all one shelf it cannot be considered as exclusively Canadian. Each
coastal segment has its share of the shelf." St. Pierre Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. 1149, para. 46.
323. St. Pierre & Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. at 1164-65, paras. 48-51.
324. Id. para. 52.
325. Id. para. 68. On the lack of precision of the term 'enclave' see also the point made
by Gotlieb, J., dissenting opinion, that even if France had won on equidistance, the entire
French zone would have been 'enclaved', i.e. contained within an outer Canadian zone.
Id. para. 38 (Gotlieb, J., dissenting opinion).
326. Id. para. 74.
327. Id. paras. 89-91. Cf. Id. para. 34 (Weil, J., dissenting opinion).
328. Id. paras. 46-48 (Weil, J., dissenting opinion). See also Id. paras. 18-19.
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no entitlement to a continental shelf or fishery zone of its own, possibly
even within the exception of Article 121.3 of UNCLOS. Its position was
only that it can only be accorded partial effect. The rejection of this
contention by the ICJ deserves a full quote:
The coast of Jan Mayen, no less than that of eastern Greenland,
generates potential title to the maritime areas recognized by customary
law, i.e. in principle up to a limit of 200 miles from its baselines. To
attribute to Norway merely the residual area left after giving full effect
to the eastern coast of Greenland, would run wholly counter to the
329
rights of Jan Mayen and also to the demands of equity.
Jan Mayen rejected even the terminology of islands receiving
partial effect. It is quite remarkable that no judge in Jan Mayen took
the position that islands, as such, should be treated differently than
other kinds of territory. Judge Adjibola quoted Vattel to the effect that:
"A dwarf is no less of a man than a giant. A small Republic is no
less of a State than the most powerful Kingdom"... .Thus however
small the Island of Jan Mayen may be, this cannot affect its rights
under international law with respect to the issue of entitlement and the
non-encroachment principle .... since Jan Mayen is acknowledged to be
an island, it is entitled to the considerations that would normally be
330
attached to other land territory."
Judge Schwebel reminded us that an island in itself cannot be a
special circumstance with limited coastal projections: "That concept is
so bizarre that naturally it finds no expression in the intentions of those
' 331
who drafted the 1958 [Geneva] Convention."
While the negotiated settlements do not contain as many clues on
their reasoning and motivation, and sometimes are affected by political
considerations and bargaining with trade-offs and concessions, 332 they
329. Id. at para. 70. See also paras. 60, 80
330. Id. at 292, 300(Ajibola, J., separate opinion).
331. Id. at 123 (Schwebel, J., separate opinion).
332. Negotiated settlements as such, even when they fall into certain patterns, absent
an opinio juris sive necessitatis or at least opinio aequitatis, do not establish norms of international law because they often reflect other considerations. According to the editor of
the massive study of more than 130 maritime boundary delimitation settlements sponsored by the American Society of International Law, the results of which are reported in
the IMB volumes:
To no one's surprise, few patters of state practice and opinio juris have
merged from these settlements. While the augmented access to this
information of foreign offices, courts and other tribunal may encourage
the development of new law, at present the international judgments
and awards have the leading oar in these murky waters.
Charney, Progress,supra note 6, at 228-29.
A striking example of the potential discrepancy between adjudication and negotiation is
provided by the Jan Mayen story itself. In the negotiated settlement between Jan Mayen
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are, overall, consistent with this jurisprudence.
C. Conclusion
The message is clear: islands as such enjoy equal status with any
other land configurations. In every instance where an island was
somehow given lesser effect, or status below equidistance, a
proportionality adjustment was being made. In no case was an island
of comparable coastal dimensions with a mainland treated differently.
The share of every island, however, like that of any other coastal
territory, is affected by applicable considerations in the general
geographical context.
VI. CONCLUSION
The equitable storm unleashed by North Sea upon maritime
delimitations is proving to be more like a tempest in a teapot. At that
early juncture, with enormous ocean stakes up for grabs, and with
divergent state interests, the ICJ wanted to preserve some flexibility in
searching for principles, methods and factors other than equidistance,
leaving some space for a more complex notion of natural prolongation,
and giving some weight to the length of the coastal frontage. This
quasi-heretical stance needed some heavy-duty protective juridical
cover, and the respectable and suitably open-ended notion of equity lent
its wings.
But genuine equity had very little to do with the dilemmas that
were addressed in drawing the boundaries of the continental shelf and
of the exclusive economic zone. Despite their ritual invocation, no
recognizable equitable principles emerged in the delimitations.
Equitable maxims which inform, and sometimes override, the specific
rules of the law, such as the doctrines of clean hands, estoppel,
acquiescence, and unjust enrichment, or corrections for mistake, undue
influence and fraud, or notions that substance prevails over form and
that rights should be pursued diligently or at least should not be

(Norway) and Iceland, the latter received the entire 200-mile zone toward Jan Mayen. In
the Jan Mayen case, Denmark sought to invoke this precedent against Jan Mayen on the
theory that it constitutes relevant conduct of the parties on what is equitable. Norway
argued that the agreement represented a 'political concession'. Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J.
38, paras. 82-84. The Court rejected the Danish position, stating that, "in the context of
relations governed by treaties, it is always for the parties concerned to decide, by agreement, in what conditions their mutual relations can best be balanced." Id. para. 86. In
the eventual decision under international law, Greenland, despite its size and coastline,
received substantially less than 200 miles. See also Judge Shahabuddeen's separate
opinion, id. paras. 18-20; Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J. 13, para. 44
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exercised in an abusive manner, which have made a dent in
international law, have no relevance to the delimitation issues. The
search for equitable results proved equally elusive.
The typical
equitable flexible remedies such as personal injunctions (including
specific performance), or adequate financial compensation, are beside
the point. The courts displayed little imagination where the remedial
aspect of equity could have helped to produce viable zones rather than
geographical aberrations, such as the St.Pierre & Miquelon mushroom
pie. The general interpretative mandate that equal circumstances
should be treated equally, and that the relevant factors should receive
their proportionate weight, presupposes that the equality and relevance
of the circumstances and factors are supplied by some identifiable
source. The courts, however, made clear that this source could not be
abstract equity or distributive justice or refashioning of geography or
just shares. Furthermore, despite some language suggesting otherwise,
the courts did not espouse a theory equivalent to abstract justice, that is
ad hoc solutions to unique geographical situations, to be perceived
through some form of unmediated and intuitive meditation over
multiple considerations and incommensurable circumstances. Indeed,
there are few subjects in human knowledge where the variety of
circumstances is more easily catalogued, classified and organized than
geography, especially the types of coastlines and their seaward
extensions. In this field, principled and predictable guidelines are
feasible and desirable. In other words, equity of the type produced by
the Chancellor's foot or, more fittingly here, the mermaid's tail, was
least needed.
This brought the courts back in a circle to square one. The source
of the equity of delimitations were the regimes of the continental shelf
and exclusive zone themselves. Such regimes had to be explored and
defined directly and internally, and the equitable label was at best
superfluous and confusing. Only standard logical and teleological
interpretation, i.e. conforming the maritime boundaries to the rationale
of the law of continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, was needed.
Such rationale was clear enough: geographical extension of land
sovereignty
over appertaining
seabeds and water
columns.
Methodologically, however, the escape to equity produced great
confusion. To suggest without more that equidistance, which is based
on the very notion of equality, produces distortions which lead to
inequitable solutions borders on the apocryphal; to say that it leads to
inequitable results because it does not take into account all relevant
circumstances calls for the ouija board! After a quarter century of
refinement through seven major cases, a large number of delimitation
agreements, a comprehensive new global treaty on the law of the sea,
and extensive commentaries by publicists, the regime of continental
shelf and exclusive economic zone boundaries has reached maturity and
no longer needs the equity blanket. Virtually all potentially relevant
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factors and considerations have been tried out in variegated settings;
most were rejected. The darling on North Sea, natural prolongation,
did not float. Economic, social, political, demographic justice, and even
geology and geography other than the coastal front were ruled out.
This negative clearance did not touch equidistance, whose role
remained major, in fact, and whose practical and equitable virtues
became increasingly recognized. Only one significant competitor of
equidistance has emerged during this maturation period: the
reasonable proportionality of shares to the length of the relevant
coastlines. Equidistance already reflects proportionality both in that it
allocates shares proportionate to distances from the coast, and that
shorter coasts typically have lesser projections. However, some further
adjustments may become necessary. Furthermore, even under a fixed
geometrical method such as equidistance, the coastal front needs to be
identified and streamlined. Proportionality does not replace or compete
with equidistance on the same plane, but rather operates to moderate
its results if, and to the extent that, geometrical method produces a
gross disproportion between the share of continental shelf or exclusive
economic zone allotted and the length of the coastline on which the
claim is based. The mechanics of correcting disproportionality have not,
as yet, been worked out adequately. A very rough and oversimplified
quantification of the results suggests a formula between two-to-one and
three-to-one equidistance-proportionality.
It is also important to mention that the reasonable proportionality
factor opens up the field for some discretionary, non-symmetrical
readjustment of lines, which enables the courts to take care of two
nagging problems in this field.
First, the treatment of islands:
proportionality makes it possible to look through the distinctions
between full, half or lesser effect or enclaving or semi-enclaving of
islands, which produce discrimination fundamentally inconsistent with
the equal rights of islands, and give all islands full effect but draw lines
closer to them in order to make the total shares correspond more to
total coast lengths. Second, such tangential factors as no-cut-off,
security and the location of resources: while equidistance normally
takes care of these ideas, some rare situations may arise needing
specialized attention. Furthermore, the non-symmetrical adjustments
of shares through proportionality may be made in a manner that
preserves their unity and corresponds to the applicable criteria of
sharing, either geographical or reflecting the need to avoid catastrophic
consequences. A method called equiratio may make the adjustments
more intelligible and intelligent.

